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ABSTRACT 
Historically, the American governance system, divided into federal, state and 
local jurisdictions, does not provide a natural vehicle for discussing public policy issues 
from a regional, multi-jurisdictional perspective. The autonomy of local jurisdictions and 
competing priorities within and among them makes regional coordination difficult. 
Efforts that seek to overcome these challenges to coordinate regionally must take into 
account the different operational structures and civic traditions of states and 
municipalities. 
The establishment of a Homeland Security Regional Structure will support the 
DHS mission of leading a unified national effort to secure America.  The homeland 
security regions will enhance the national effort to prepare for threats and hazards to the 
nation.  The regional structure will move DHS support closer to state, and local 
governments that have been overwhelmed by new requirements for homeland security 
within their jurisdictions.  Engaging state and local governments at the regional level 
provides the best opportunities for the integration of homeland security efforts across all 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM  
Congress established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to coordinate 
federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector efforts to prevent, prepare for, respond to, 
and recover from incidents of national significance.  Entering its third year, DHS is 
making progress coordinating federal efforts, but efforts to engage state and local 
governments have been limited to exercises, the National Response Plan rollout, and 
grant programs aimed at increasing local response capabilities.  The current DHS 
organization for state and local coordination exceeds the effective span of control to be 
managed centrally from DHS headquarters.1  Representative Mike Rogers, in a statement 
before the House Subcommittee on Integration, Management, and Oversight stated, “I 
think there is glaring problem of inadequate integration between Homeland and the states 
and local governments.”2  DHS cannot successfully integrate homeland missions with 
state and local partners from Washington, D.C.  The Nation’s ability to prepare for, 
prevent, respond to, and recover from disasters depends on the ability to organize and 
coordinate a community of first responders; federal, state, and local agencies; and, private 
sector entities.3 
State and local governments must be more engaged in developing and 
implementing a national homeland security strategy for DHS to successfully complete the 
mission it was created to execute.  In order to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and 
recover from future incidents of national significance, such as the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, the Department of Homeland Security needs to reach beyond the Federal 
government and work with state and local governments within the national homeland  
 
                                                 
1 In this document “span of control” refers to the number of organizations DHS officials coordinate 
with directly.  Span of control in business is normally defined as between 4 and 7 subordinates.  Optimally 
the Regional Homeland Security Director would coordinate with between 4 and 7 states. 
2 House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Management Challenges Facing the 
Department of Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2005), 61. 
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/legis/nps17-042006-02.pdf.  (accessed September 21, 2006). 
3 This thesis will not specifically address the coordination of homeland security missions with the 
private sector. 
2 
security strategy.  All disasters are local, clearly illustrated by Hurricane Katrina that 
devastated New Orleans, and we must build a stronger foundation at the state and local 
levels.4 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for coordinated and focused 
effort from the Federal government, state and local governments, the private sector, and 
the American people.5  DHS must implement a national strategy, not a federal strategy, to 
make America stronger, safer, and more secure.  Thus far DHS efforts to lead federal 
coordination have not led to a unified strategy that integrates federal, state, and local 
homeland security activities.  The National Homeland Security Strategy is handicapped 
by the lack of incorporation of expertise or consent of public safety organizations at the 
state or local level.6   
Would a DHS field structure, a DHS Headquarters element assigned to multi-
state geographic areas, more effectively engage state and local governments to 
coordinate homeland security activities to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover 
from incidents of national significance? 
State and local first responders form the backbone of the homeland security 
response system.  The Department of Homeland Security must foster partnerships with 
state and local resources to coordinate the federal resources required to respond to major 
incidents.  The vast majority of disasters will be responded to by state and local 
governments, with the Federal government stepping in to provide support only in unique 
                                                 
4 James Carafano and Richard Weitz., “Learning from Disaster: The Role of Federalism and the 
Importance of Grassroots Response,” Backgrounder No. 1923 (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 
2006). http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/upload/95417_1.pdf. (accessed September 21, 
2006). 
5 The White House, The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: The White 
House, 2002), vii. 
6 International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), From Hometown Security to Homeland 
Security (Alexandria, VA: IACP 2006). http://www.iacp.org/leg_policy/Homeland SecurityWP.pdf. 
(accessed September 21, 2006). 
3 
circumstances.7  The operational response to a fast-moving disaster such as Katrina or 
9/11 simply cannot be managed from Washington.8 
A layered approach to homeland security that coordinates capabilities at the local, 
state, regional, and national levels would better synthesize all levels of government into a 
national strategy.  DHS currently relies on state and local governments to identify 
capability shortfalls during an incident and then request Federal assistance.  As a result 
DHS, as the executive agent for homeland security for the Federal government, 
consistently plays a reactionary role in incident response.   
DHS does not have the ability to regularly assess the collaborative capabilities of 
state and local responders in order to determine resource shortfalls and assistance 
requirements.  The integration of homeland security activities at the state and local levels 
appears to be inconsistent and normally exists only for law enforcement situations.  
Reactive strategies for homeland security incidents have proven to be insufficient; 
forward-leaning strategies are required given the probability of situations where state and 
local responders will require federal assistance.   
Response activities are initiated as soon as a disaster is detected or threatens.  The 
initial response is normally undertaken by local first responders and government.  
Response involves mobilizing and positioning emergency equipment; moving people out 
of danger; providing needed food, water, shelter and medical services; and restoring 
damaged services and systems.  If the response requirement is beyond the capabilities of 
state and local governments federal assistance is requested.   
DHS needs the ability to proactively respond to the shortfalls in state and local 
capabilities.  Actively engaging state and local governments as a partner in homeland 
security planning and operations will better enable DHS to anticipate the requirements of 
these entities to respond to natural and manmade incidents.  Synthesizing the capabilities  
 
                                                 
7 Frank Cilluffo, Hurricane Katrina Recommendations for Reform (Washington, D.C.: George 
Washington University, 2006). http://www.gwu.edu/~dhs/congress/March8_06.htm. (accessed September 
21, 2006). 
8 The Heritage Foundation, Empowering America: A Proposal for Enhancing Regional Preparedness. 
(Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 2006). 
www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/SR06.cfm. (accessed September 21, 2006). 
4 
of all levels of government into a national strategy will provide greater opportunities to 
identify and fill capability shortfalls though proactive response at each level of 
government. 
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned identified four 
critical flaws in the national preparedness effort: the process for establishing a unified 
command; command and control structures within the Federal government; knowledge of 
preparedness plans; and regional planning and coordination.9  The catastrophic nature of 
Hurricane Katrina stressed the response capabilities at all levels of government.  The loss 
of many functional capabilities of state and local response organizations significantly 
hampered the response effort.  Federal officials arriving in impacted areas did not 
understand state and local government relationships, capabilities, or communications.   
DHS and FEMA have been widely criticized for their slow response to Hurricane 
Katrina.  Experience has shown that effective response cannot be managed from 
Washington.10  As early as August 26th, the National Hurricane Center predicted Katrina 
would make landfall as a major hurricane just east of New Orleans.11  State and local 
authorities began to prepare for the worst case scenario.  FEMA pre-staged commodities 
and emergency response assets to respond to the storm.  As the storm approached citizens 
who had been unable to evacuate showed up at shelters.  Officials at all levels were 
unsure about how many people would seek shelters of last resort such as the Superdome.  
New Orleans Mayor, Ray Nagin asserted that the Superdome could accommodate 50,000 
to 70,000 people.12  Neither federal, state, nor local emergency managers were prepared 
to support such a massive effort.  As a result, evacuees were stranded without food or 
water. 
On August 30th Secretary Chertoff designated Michael Brown, then Under 
Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, as the PFO for incident 
management during the response and recovery operations for Hurricane Katrina.  Katrina 
                                                 
9 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, 
D.C.: The White House, 2006), 52. 
10 Cilluffo, Hurricane Katrina Recommendations for Reform.  
11 White House, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 23. 
12 Ibid., 30. 
5 
had disabled most of the state and local response capabilities in New Orleans.  Although 
Emergency Management Assistance Compacts were in place, the regional impact of the 
hurricane prevented neighboring jurisdictions from providing assistance.  As the PFO, 
Mr. Brown’s task was to facilitate federal support to the established unified command 
(UC).  The devastation caused by Katrina, however, incapacitated state and local 
response capabilities requiring the Federal government to take on the incident command 
role.  The Federal government, limited by a lack of knowledge of the local area or 
response capabilities, struggled to establish a unified command in the absence of a 
coordinated state and local response. 
The Unified Command links the organizations responding to the incident and 
provides a forum for these entities to make consensus decisions. Under the UC, the 
various jurisdictions and/or agencies and non-government responders may blend together 
throughout the operation to create an integrated response team.13 
The Unified Command is responsible for overall management of the incident.  
The UC directs incident activities, including development and implementation of overall 
objectives and strategies, and approves ordering and releasing of resources.  Members of 
the UC work together to develop a common set of incident objectives and strategies, 
share information, maximize the use of available resources, and enhance the efficiency of 
the individual response organizations.14 
Effective coordination among local, state, and federal responders at the scene of a 
response is a key factor in successfully responding to major incidents.  The unified 
command structure provides a flexible organization capable of changing to meet evolving 
situations.  The Joint Coordination Group serves as a unified command structure for 
federal, state, and local coordination in the Joint Field Office.  The purpose of the unified 
command is to link response organizations together in order to facilitate consensus 
decisions.  The Unified Command brings together the various jurisdictions to create an  
 
 
                                                 
13 U.S. Coast Guard, Incident Management Handbook (Washington, D.C.: USCG, 2001). 
14 Ibid. 
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integrated response team.15  During the response to Hurricane Katrina, the multiple 
Federal coordinators with varying sources of authority frustrated state and local officials 
in the region.16   
The PFO facilitates federal support to the established unified command structure 
and coordinates federal incident management activities.  Following Hurricane Katrina, 
however, state and local governments lacked the ability to coordinate a response.  State 
and local officials were not able to establish an effective unified command due to the loss 
of communications, response capabilities, and personnel.  The PFO was unable to 
coordinate an effective response with the remaining state and local responders without a 
functioning incident command structure.  Multiple, overlapping federal, state, and local 
jurisdictions precluded establishing clear lines of authority and accountability that 
actually put people in charge.17 
Prior to the establishment of DHS, FEMA operated as an independent, cabinet 
level agency with the FEMA Director reporting directly to the President.  After his 
designation as PFO, Michael Brown reverted to the pre-DHS relationship bypassing 
Secretary Chertoff and dealing directly with the President.  In Mr. Brown’s words, “Let 
me give you an example of what happened in Louisiana. I would give an order for 
something to happen.  And somebody would go talk to Chertoff. And Chertoff would 
give a different order. And so there was this confusion about who was in charge.  I should 
have been in charge in there. I should have been making those decisions. And Chertoff 
should not have been second-guessing those decisions.”18   
During the response to Hurricane Katrina, Mr. Brown was criticized for being 
disconnected from state and local officials and the situation on the ground.  At the local 
level, Brown told House committee members that one of his biggest faults in the response 
was not being able to convince Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco and New Orleans 
                                                 
15 U.S. Coast Guard, Incident Management Handbook (Washington, D.C.: USCG, 2001). 
16 Col Jeff Smith, Deputy Director of Louisiana Department of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Preparedness, in Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. 42 
17 Christian Beckner, “The Root Causes of Homeland Security Dysfunction,” Homeland Security 
Watch, May 18, 2006. http://www.hlswatch.com/2006/05/18/the-root-causes-of-homeland-security-
dysfunction/. (accessed September 20, 2006). 
18 Fox News Transcript of Interview with Michael Brown, March 6, 2006      
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,186860,00.html.  (accessed September 20, 2006).   
7 
Mayor Ray Nagin to act faster.19  Mr. Brown laid blame on state and local officials for 
the government's failed response to the disaster.  The lack of common understanding of 
the situation, plans, and capabilities of each level of government appears to have 
contributed to confusion and delays. 
Hurricane Katrina was the first real life test of the NRP, which was signed in 
December 2004.  The PFO is designated by DHS’ Secretary to act as the Secretary’s local 
representative in overseeing and executing the incident management responsibilities 
under HSPD–5 for Incidents of National Significance. The PFO is to provide the 
Secretary with pertinent information and coordinate the federal effort, but the PFO does 
not direct or replace the Incident Command System and structure, and does not have 
direct authority over the senior law enforcement official, the FCO, or other federal and 
state officials.20 The PFO does not have directive authority over other federal or state 
officials which created confusion in the field about who was “in charge”.  There was also 
confusion over the different roles and responsibilities performed by the Principal Federal 
Official (PFO) and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO).  This confusion contributed 
to undermining coordination efforts across federal, state, and local levels. 
State and local evacuation plans did not address post hurricane evacuation of New 
Orleans.  The Superdome, housing thousands of evacuees, was cut off by rising 
floodwaters preventing evacuation and delivery of food and water.  Federal officials, who 
were not familiar with Louisiana’s plans, were unprepared for a large-scale evacuation or 
re-supply effort.  Federal, state, and local officials worked to evacuate more then 35,000 
people from New Orleans.21  The unplanned evacuation resulted in many evacuees not 
knowing where they were going and receiving states having little notice of the number or 
arrival times of evacuees.  Federal and state officials had difficulty coordinating 
transportation assets during the evacuation; thus, the evacuation effort was largely 
uncoordinated and haphazard.  Heading into the 2006 hurricane season, Louisiana and 
DHS officials remain at odds over who is in charge of evacuations and shelters.  In a 
                                                 
19 Spencer Hsu, “Brown Defends FEMA’s Efforts; Former Agency Director Spreads Blame for 
Failures in Katrina Response,” Washington Post, September 28, 2005. http://www.washington post/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/09/27/AR2005092700709.html. (accessed September 20, 2006). 
20 DHS, National Response Plan, (Washington, D.C: GPO 2006).  
21 White House, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. 
8 
sharply worded letter sent to Secretary Chertoff, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco 
cataloged what she saw as multiple shortcomings in the Department of Homeland 
Security’s plans for the 2006 hurricane season.22 
The response to Hurricane Katrina was hampered at all levels by the lack of 
familiarity of senior officials with response plans.  Former FEMA director Michael 
Brown testified to the White House Committee investigating the federal response to 
Hurricane Katrina that it was not his job to take over the evacuation of New Orleans and 
rescue the drowning city from the hurricane.  “FEMA doesn't own fire trucks; we don't 
own ambulances; we don't own search-and-rescue equipment. In fact, the only search-
and-rescue or emergency equipment that we own is a very small cadre to protect some 
property that we own around the country. FEMA is a coordinating agency. We are not a 
law enforcement agency," he said.23  FEMA’s role is not intended to be that of first 
responders, its role is to help organize search-and-rescue, medical response, and other 
response capabilities in a partnership. 
DHS did not have an appropriate organization for ensuring a rapid understanding 
and adoption of the NRP and NIMS throughout the Federal government.  The goal of the 
National Response Plan is to provide a streamlined framework for swiftly delivering 
federal assistance when a disaster overwhelms state and local officials Secretary 
Chertoff's hesitation to initiate a response to Hurricane Katrina until after the passing of 
the storm and President Bush's creation of a DOD task force both appear to contradict the 
National Response Plan and previous presidential directives that specify what the 
secretary of homeland security is assigned to do without further presidential orders.24  
Under the NRP, “Standard procedures regarding requests for assistance may be expedited 




                                                 
22 Interview with Michael Brown. 
23 Interview with Michael Brown. 
24 Jonathan S. Landay, Alison Young and Shannon McCaffrey, “Chertoff delayed federal response, 
memo shows.” Knight Ridder Newspapers http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/12637172.htm. 
(accessed September 20, 2006.) 
9 
catastrophic magnitude.  Notification and full coordination with the States will occur, but 
the coordination process must not delay or impede the rapid deployment and use of 
critical resources."25 
The national response capability failed during Hurricane Katrina due to a lack of 
coordination and communication between responders at all levels of government.  DHS 
must establish a preparedness organization to work in partnership with other federal, 
state, and local agencies to develop an all hazards homeland security strategy.  
Establishing a field structure would enable DHS more closely coordinate homeland 
security activities to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from incidents of 
national significance. 
Implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the 
National Response Plan (NRP) and expanding regional collaboration are priorities of the 
National Preparedness Goal.  The development of DHS regions that are staffed, trained, 
and equipped to coordinate federal, state, and local preparedness and respond to 
emergencies that require Federal response will promote unity of effort within DHS and 
with external stakeholders.  The regional concept provides critical support for the total 
integration of the DHS and the national homeland security strategy to meet its mission of 
protecting the homeland. 
1. Have We Implemented a National Homeland Security Strategy? 
The creation of DHS has done little to alleviate the confusion over who is 
responsible for homeland security.  The Secretary is responsible for coordinating and 
consulting with other federal, state, and local government agencies in developing and 
implementing national plans and policies.  The Federal government relies on state and 
local governments for information and response, but currently appears to lack the 
capability or desire to effectively share information or provide a proactive response.  
Homeland Security requires a national effort undertaken as a cooperative endeavor across 
all levels of government and private sector entities. 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security provides the framework for 
organizing homeland security efforts across levels of government and industry.  The 
                                                 
25 DHS, National Response Plan. 
10 
Strategy designates the Department of Homeland Security as the primary federal point of 
contact for state and local governments, and the private sector.  In this capacity, DHS is 
responsible for coordinating and supporting implementation of non-federal homeland 
security tasks.26  Although the Strategy establishes the requirement for DHS to reach 
beyond the capabilities of the Federal government to coordinate the homeland security 
strategy with state, local, and private sector strategies, DHS lacks an effective capability 
to facilitate coordination with state and local governments and the private sector.27   
Homeland security activities require close coordination between the Federal 
government and state and local governments in order to efficiently and effectively 
manage risk and allocate resources.  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-
8) seeks to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to 
threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by 
establishing mechanisms to improve the delivery of federal preparedness assistance to 
state, local, and tribal governments.28  The primary means of federal preparedness 
coordination continues to be through grants, training, and exercises.  Preparedness 
planning requires that DHS have a much better understanding of state and local 
strategies, policies, procedures, and capabilities. 
DHS has not established a primary local point of contact for coordination of 
homeland security initiatives and strategies in conjunction with state and local partners.  
Multi-jurisdictional partnerships dedicated to facilitating and coordinating homeland 
security efforts within geographic regions and across levels of government are needed in 
order to implement a truly national strategy. 
2. Where are We Now? 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland 
Security to prevent terrorist attacks; reduce the nation’s vulnerability to terrorism, natural 
disasters and other emergencies; minimize the damage and assist in the response and 
                                                 
26 The National Strategy for Homeland Security was written prior to approval of the Homeland 
Security Act.  The Strategy refers to the roles of the proposed Department of Homeland Security. 
27 James Carafano and  David  Heyman, “DHS 2.0: Rethinking the Department of Homeland 
Security,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 2, December 13, 2004, 
www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/sr02.cfm. (accessed December 26, 2005). 
28 President Bush, HSPD-8 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2003). 
http://knxup2.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/whitehouse/nps05-121803-02.pdf.  (accessed January 29, 2006). 
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recovery from incidents that do occur.29  Establishing the Department of Homeland 
Security was the most extensive government reorganization since the National Security 
Act of 1947. 
DHS still faces the challenge of integrating the “stovepiped” operations of 
twenty–two agencies into a single organization.  Successfully transforming the 
Department will require an integrated management approach.  Shortly after taking office, 
Secretary Michael Chertoff ordered the Department to undergo a systematic review of 
operations, policies, and organization.  The Second Stage Review resulted in the 
Secretary’s Six Point Agenda and the realignment of organization structures in the 
Department.  The realignment resulted in the functions of the Office of State and Local 
Coordination sifting further into the bureaucracy within the newly established 
Preparedness Directorate.  Although the Second Stage Review was not implemented prior 
to the 2005 Hurricane Season, the proposed realignment indicated a growing separation 
of Federal efforts from those of state and local governments. 
The Homeland Security Act also designates DHS as a focal point for natural and 
manmade crises and emergency planning.30  In order to be successful, DHS must marshal 
the resources of the Federal, state, and local governments.  Establishing policies, 
standards, and providing funding support for homeland security resides at the Federal 
government level.  State and local governments, however, are best positioned to provide 
resources for detection, prevention, and recovery.  Many state and local government 
officials do not fully recognize their roles and responsibilities for homeland security.  
Building the relationships to establish and maintain partnerships with state and local 
governments will require a dedicated effort by DHS to understand the political, 
budgetary, and strategic issues to effectively coordinate preparedness. 
Primary responsibility for leading response and recovery efforts falls to state and 
local governments who are closest to those affected by terrorist acts and natural disasters.  
Local governments are responsible for developing emergency plans and providing safety 
                                                 
29 Congress, Homeland Security Act of 2002, (Findlaw, 2002). 
http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/hsa2002.pdf. (accessed September 20, 
2006). 
30 Congress, Homeland Security Act. 
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and security prior to an incident.  In response to a potential or actual incident, the local 
government provides first response on-scene and determines the need for additional 
support from the state and Federal governments.  In the event the local government 
requires assistance the state is responsible for mobilizing additional state and regional 
resources to assist and implementing the state’s emergency management functions. The 
state is also in charge of requesting federal support though the formal disaster declaration 
process.  The Federal government acts in a supporting role, providing assistance, 
logistical support, resources, and certain supplies. 
The response to Hurricane Katrina at all levels of government created or 
reinforced mistrust between federal, state, and local governments.  As the executive agent 
of the Federal government, DHS was responsible for managing the response, relief, and 
recovery efforts of the Federal government agencies.  FEMA is not a first response entity, 
but is responsible for supporting first responders.  The Federal government relies on state 
and local officials to identify mission and commodity requirements to FEMA, which 
coordinates with other federal agencies or the private sector for goods and services. 
The Stafford Act is based upon the Federal government providing supplemental 
assistance to a State, whereas the Incident Command System (ICS), required by the NRP 
and NIMS, is based upon who can best meet a need.  The ICS is able to respond to 
requests for assistance much faster than the Stafford Act processes.31  Lack of 
coordination and organization at the Federal government level during Katrina resulted in 
delays of delivery of food and water and the evacuation of hurricane victims.  The 
mission assignment process created by the Federal government proved too cumbersome 
to quickly respond to the needs federal assistance.  As a result of this cumbersome 
process, federal agencies acted under their independent authorities, rather than waiting 
for mission assignments from FEMA, thereby creating further confusion in the response 
effort.  Too often, the response was plagued by emergency support functions (ESFs) and 
other Federal agencies taking direction from their own higher headquarters that conflicted 
with the direction that the FCO had coordinated.32 
                                                 
31 DHS/FEMA, “Initial Response Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana,” DR-1603-LA, February 
13, 2006. http://www.disasterthebook.com/docs/Katrina_initial_response_hotwash.pdf (accessed 
September 20, 2006). 
32 Ibid. 
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National preparedness planning requires a collaborative effort between Federal, 
state, and local governments.  Following Hurricane Katrina the President directed DHS to 
conduct a Nationwide Plan Review to provide a rapid assessment of the status of 
catastrophic planning for all fifty states and seventy-five of the Nation’s largest urban 
areas.  The Phase One report based on state self-assessments in February 2006 showed a 
range of capabilities and planning.  The Phase Two report issued in June further assessed 
the capabilities of states, pinpoints shortfalls, and makes specific recommendations to 
help achieve a better state of preparedness.  The review concentrated on catastrophic and 
evacuation planning.  The review concluded that catastrophic planning is unsystematic 
and is not linked within a national planning system.33  A newly established National 
Preparedness Task Force will oversee DHS efforts to strengthen and systematize 
catastrophic planning among all levels of government. 
3. Developing a National Strategy Approach to Homeland Security 
Homeland security depends on collaborative relationships with homeland security 
partners.  The National Response Plan (NRP) provides guidelines for how the Federal 
government will provide assistance to state and local governments during an incident of 
national significance.  The NRP consolidates Federal government emergency response 
plans into a single, coordinated national plan, as called for by HSPD-5.  In terms of 
functions, the NRP organizes the resources that are most likely to be needed during an 
incident response. Working in conjunction with the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS), the NRP establishes organizations and procedures that provide a standard 
framework for incident management.  The NRP and NIMS are designed to create an 
integrated response that considers the involvement of multiple jurisdictions and multiple 
responders.  According to the Heritage Foundation, these documents are prerequisites for 
a regional homeland security framework, but DHS lacks a suitable operational structure 
to support them.34  
                                                 
33 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review: Phase 2 Report. (Washington, 
D.C.: DHS 2006). http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Prep_NationwidePlanReview.pdf. (accessed 
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34Edwin Meese, James Carafano, and Richard Weitz, “Organizing for Victory: Proposals for Building 
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The traditions of federalism and limited government in the United States require 
that organizations outside of the Federal government take the lead in many homeland 
security initiatives.35  Federalism limits the Federal government’s ability to mandate 
actions to state and local governments.  No state or local jurisdiction willingly 
relinquishes its authority or control to an external entity, particularly the Federal 
government.36   
Existing FEMA Regional Interagency Steering Committees (RISCs) seek to 
manage risk and allocate resources, provide regular forums and communications channels 
to exchange information, coordinate federal assistance to state, local, and tribal 
governments, coordinate assistance and participation in training and exercise programs, 
and coordinate information and intelligence sharing, and information sharing within the 
FEMA regions37.  The role of the RISCs has not expanded beyond disaster response 
capabilities and does not provide an all-hazards capability to meet the requirements of the 
National Response Plan.   
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has published several reports that 
support the need for closer coordination between the Federal government and state and 
local governments.  Among its findings, GAO recognizes that regional organizations that 
include representation from many different jurisdictions and diverse stakeholders serve as 
structured forums for these parties to discuss public policy problems and agree on 
possible solutions.38  DHS is responsible for developing a national, all-hazards approach 
to homeland security by preparing all sectors of society to prepare for any emergency 
event.   
No single jurisdiction or agency would be expected to perform every task, first 
responders require access to regional and federal resources, or some combination of the 
                                                 
35 The White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2002). 
36 Beckner, “Root causes of homeland security dysfunction.” 
37 Dan Brown, “Regional Interagency Steering Committee (RISC),” In Other News... (FEMA Region 
V), at www.fema.gov/regions/v/newsletter/volume_4/news_n02.htm. (accessed December 31, 2005).   
38 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can 
Enhance Emergency Preparedness, GAO-04-1009, September 2004, 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d041009.pdf. (accessed December 26, 2005). 
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two.39  As the primary federal agency responsible for emergency management, DHS is 
charged with ensuring state and local first responders have the capabilities necessary to 
provide a coordinated response to a major incident. 
The DHS Strategy for Homeland Security calls for building coalitions and 
partnerships rooted in the precepts of federalism.40  While he was Secretary of Homeland 
Security and in a Washington Times article, Tom Ridge was a proponent of establishing 
multi-state regions to coordinate DHS operations.  DHS, more than any other cabinet 
agency, depends upon the integration of people, capabilities, and information in order to 
achieve its mission.41  Currently DHS does not have an organization that can interact 
with state and local governments on a day-to-day basis to develop an understanding of 
preparedness requirements. 
The Markle Foundation recommended that DHS work with state and local 
governments and private sector entities to create decentralized analytical centers and 
foster their ability to communicate with other players in the network.42  Information and 
intelligence sharing between the Federal government and state and local governments 
would allow all levels to better evaluate threat information to prevent future terrorist 
incidents.  The Federal government must identify the role that state and local agencies 
and the private sector should play as informed partners in homeland security.43  
Information fusion is needed to build and share knowledge of current capabilities and  
 
 
                                                 
39 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First 
Responders' All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve, GAO-05-652, July 11, 2005. 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d05652.pdf. (accessed September 20, 2006). 
40 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Securing Our Homeland: U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security Strategic Plan,” www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/DHS_StratPlan_FINAL_spread.pdf. 
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41 Tom Ridge, “Measuring Homeland Security,” Washington Times, December 13, 2005, at 
www.washingtontimes.com  (accessed December 13, 2005). 
42 Task Force on National Security in the Information Age, “Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security,” 
Markle Foundation, December 2, 2003, www.markletaskforce.org/reports/TFNS_Report2_Master.pdf. (accessed 
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43 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: Federal Leadership Needed to 
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emerging critical needs by maintaining an integrated common operational picture to 
provide leaders and incident responders with current information on incidents and 
resources.  
The vision for the National Preparedness Goal is: “To engage federal, state, local, 
and tribal entities, their private and nongovernmental partners, and the general public to 
achieve and sustain risk-based target levels of capability to prevent, protect against, 
respond to, and recover from major events in order to minimize the impact on lives, 
property, and the economy.”44  The National Preparedness Goal requires the coordination 
of preparedness programs, including training and exercise programs, for all-hazards 
preparedness.  Preparedness programs should provide federal support to state and local 
governments to meet national preparedness program goals and integrate federal 
participation in training and exercises.  Preparedness programs should be based on the 
principles of the National Incident Management System, the National Response Plan, and 
the National Planning Scenarios.   
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8), National Preparedness, 
tasks DHS to oversee and support preparedness evaluations and assessments to assist in 
contingency planning and development of comprehensive all-hazards preparedness 
strategies for each state.  In testimony before the House, Secretary Chertoff stated, 
“Congress and the department allocates tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars to 
each state and to certain local governments across the country without the prerequisite 
analysis of risk.”45  Preparedness evaluations and risk assessments are essential elements 
to provide guidance to state and local governments on resource requirements to tie the 
grant process to the homeland security strategy and ensure efficient and effective 
allocation of homeland security assets and monitor the grant process. 
State and local governments require the capability to identify emerging threats 
and then simultaneously share that information across all levels of government in order to 
prevent and prepare for terrorist attacks.  Currently state and local governments do not 
                                                 
44 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal, December 2005. 
http://knxup2.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/nps03-010306-02.pdf, 1. (accessed January 29, 2006). 
45 U.S. Congress, House, Committee for Homeland Security, “Testimony by Secretary Michael 
Chertoff before the House Homeland Security Committee,” April 13, 2005, 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4460. (December 30, 2005).  
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have a single point of contact outside of DHS headquarters to facilitate information 
sharing and threat assessment, develop regional plans, assist in planning for National 
Special Security Events and Homeland Security Special Events, or to coordinate federal 
assistance as required.  DHS assistance to state and local governments to coordinate 
strategic risk assessments, scenario-based contingency planning, grant program 
assessments, training programs and exercises would help develop an understanding of 
state and local capabilities. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3 (HSPD-3), Homeland Security 
Advisory System, established a system to “inform and facilitate decisions appropriate to 
different levels of government and to private citizens at home and at work.”46  State and 
local governments have indicated continuing confusion regarding the recommendations 
for heightened security measures when changing Homeland Security Advisory System 
(HSAS) alert levels.47  Clearly defined and consistently applied policies and procedures 
have not been used to provide guidance to state and local governments on raising and 
lowering HSAS levels.  Changes in the HSAS level should be closely coordinated with 
state and local governments to communicate the national risk of terrorist acts to federal, 
state, local, public and private sector entities and to identify appropriate protective 
measures to implement in response to the threat.  
B. STRATEGIC ISSUES - SPECIFIC RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
In creating the Department of Homeland Security, Congress established a national 
framework to coordinate homeland security missions.  The current DHS organization 
attempts to coordinate homeland security missions from a national headquarters 
perspective with limited planning and coordination with state and local governments.  
The objective of this research project is to provide an organizational model to coordinate 
homeland security efforts and determine if a DHS field structure would provide a more 
effective approach to coordinating homeland security missions with state and local 
governments.  Specific areas of emphasis are: 
                                                 
46 U.S. President, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3 (HSPD-3), Homeland Security 
Advisory System, 11 March 2002. http://knxup2.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/whitehouse/HSPD%203.pdf 
(January 29, 2006). 
47 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: Communication Protocols and Risk 
Communication Principles Can Assist in Refining the Advisory System, GAO-04-682, June 2004 at 
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• Preparation and prevention activities will develop ongoing partnerships 
between state and local governments and their federal counterparts. 
• The state and local levels, where the majority of homeland security 
activities take place, provide the best opportunities for integration of 
homeland security efforts. 
• DHS field regional personnel would be strategically located to integrate 
communications and coordination, contingency operations, planning and 
analysis, preparedness, training and exercises, and situational awareness.   
• One of the DHS’s overarching national priorities is to expand 
regionalization at the state and local levels through the National 
Preparedness Goal. 
C. HYPOTHESES/POLICY OPTIONS 
DHS should develop the capability to better engage state and local governments 
in a national homeland strategy in order to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover 
from future incidents of national significance.  The current DHS organization centralizes 
coordination of homeland security activities within the Preparedness Directorate in 
Washington, D.C.  Developing a DHS field structure will provide an environment to 
develop federal, state, and local partnerships to better coordinate homeland security 
planning and analysis, situational awareness, preparedness, and communications.   
DHS is in the process of developing a program of Federal Preparedness 
Coordinators (FPC), who will coordinate homeland security activities in the Urban Areas 
Security Initiative (UASI) areas.  The FPCs will be responsible for promoting the 
integration and synchronization of preparedness functions across jurisdictions and all 
levels of government, and leading the effort to enhance our national level of preparedness 
with particular focus in the Nation’s highest risk areas.  Each FPC will oversee the 
integrated preparedness efforts in their geographic area, including preparedness 
assessments, contingency planning, exercises and training, and information sharing. 
The Homeland Security Act required DHS to submit a plan to Congress for 
consolidating the regional offices of agencies transferred to the Department; the Act does  
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not, however, provide specific guidelines for a regional structure or identify the purpose 
of the regional organization.48  The DHS regional concept focused on three mission 
areas: 
• Coordinating homeland security functions with federal, state, local, tribal 
and private sector stakeholders; 
• Integrating the core functions of DHS components within the regions; and 
• Enabling more effective and efficient delivery of DHS services within the 
regions. 
The regional concept was not implemented, in part due to the inability to 
coordinate the transfer of component agency operational functions during contingency 
operations.  The political and statutory concerns of integrating the core functions of DHS 
component agencies are not addressed in this paper.  The objective of this research 
project is to determine if a DHS field structure would provide a more effective approach 
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II. ORGANIZING HOMELAND SECURITY 
A. DEVELOPING THE FEDERAL ROLE 
Throughout much of the history of the United States, Civil Defense referred to 
non-military efforts to prepare the American populace for a military attack.  Since the 
creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the term and practice 
of civil defense has been replaced by emergency management and homeland security.49  
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) brought together twenty-two Federal 
agencies to consolidate the homeland security functions of the Federal government.  
Homeland security, however, extends beyond the Federal government.  DHS must better 
engage state and local governments in a national homeland security strategy to fill 
existing shortfalls in coordinating prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery 
operations. 
Until the establishment of DHS, the United States maintained a piece meal 
approach to emergency management.  The initial emergency management efforts on the 
part of the Federal government were directed at compensating businesses for losses from 
disasters.  The Congressional Act of 1803 waived duties and tariffs for goods after fire 
devastated the city of Portsmouth, New Hampshire.  Over the following 127 years, 
Congress passed more than 100 pieces of legislation for restoration or compensation of 
damages resulting from disasters.  During these years, however, there was no singular 
federal agency charged with emergency management. 
In 1932, President Herbert Hoover established the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (RFC).  The primary purpose of the RFC was distribution of loans to help 
stimulate the economy to recover from the Great Depression.  The RFC was also tasked 
to distribute federal loans for repair and reconstruction of public facilities in areas 
impacted by earthquakes and later for other disasters.  Distribution of recovery funds was 
later legislated to the Bureau of Public Roads for reconstruction of road and highways 
damaged by disasters and the Army Corps of Engineers for flood relief.  Between 1932 
and 1979 more than 100 federal agencies were responsible for some type of disaster 
                                                 
49 Wikipedia, “United States Civil Defense,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_defense. (accessed 
September 20, 2006). 
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relief.  This piecemeal approach to emergency management was fraught with scant 
interagency cooperation and bureaucracy.  
In 1979, at the prompting of the National Governor’s Association, President 
Jimmy Carter created the Federal Emergency Management Agency to coordinate all 
federal disaster relief efforts.  With the establishment of DHS following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, FEMA moved into the Emergency Preparedness and 
Response Directorate of the new department.  FEMA and DHS were both severely 
chastised for their performance during the response to Hurricane Katrina, resulting in 
calls for FEMA to again become an independent agency.  Although the agency remained 
in DHS, the director position has been upgraded and is now the Under Secretary of 
Federal Emergency Management. 
B. THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
Congress established the Department Homeland Security (DHS) to coordinate 
federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector efforts to prevent, prepare for, respond to, 
and recover from incidents of national significance.  Entering its third year, DHS is 
making progress coordinating federal efforts, however, efforts to engage state and local 
governments have been limited to grant programs aimed at increasing local response 
capabilities.  The Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness 
can not effectively mange state and local coordination from Washington, D.C.  The 
current DHS organization for state and local coordination exceeds the effective span of 
control to be managed centrally from DHS headquarters.  DHS component agencies have 
multiple internal jurisdictional boundaries.  The component agencies with the Department 
of Homeland Security have maintained their field organizations without a coordinating 
DHS field organization.  This continues to create confusion among state and local 
governments that often deal with several “DHS” officials with differing missions and 
points of view.  
Part of the reason that DHS remains so ineffective is that it is not yet fully 
integrated; it remains merely a collection of variously dysfunctional components 
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operating under a common name, logo, and motto.50  A primary function of DHS should 
be the integration of Federal homeland security efforts and developing interoperability 
with state and local agencies.  An enterprise approach to reorganization should focus 
upon developing direction for what is needed to be accomplished instead of just taking 
old structures and having them do the same things over and over again.51   
The creation of DHS has increased cooperation between agencies in the 
Department; however, each agency maintains its own operational control.  Lack of 
common command and control structures and differing agency objectives contribute to a 
fragmented approach to homeland security.  Recognizing that DHS is made up of 
agencies that retained their legacy functions and systems, DHS needs to establish unity of 
effort among DHS component agencies in order to achieve a national homeland security 
strategy.  The White House Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned report confirms the need 
to integrate and synchronize national homeland security policies, strategies, and plans 
across Federal, State and local governments.52 
DHS is a series of stovepipes.53  A lack of unity of effort among DHS 
components and with Federal, State, and local partners appears to be one of the 
fundamental issues with current homeland security initiatives.  “Integrating its many 
components into a single, effective, and economical department remains one of DHS’ 
biggest challenges.”54  The Department was established to coordinate federal, state, and 
local efforts to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from incidents of national 
significance.  Although the establishment of DHS brought together many of the agencies 
                                                 
50 Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Management Challenges Facing the 
Department of Homeland Security, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and 
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52 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. 
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/whitehouse/nps10-022306-01.pdf. (accessed July 17, 2006). 
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54 Ibid., testimony of Richard Skinner, April 20, 2005.  
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responsible for homeland security, the Department has not been successful in identifying 
roles and responsibilities among federal, state, and local departments and agencies.   
The transformation of twenty-two federal agencies with multiple missions, values, 
and cultures into a single department presents the opportunity to create a national 
homeland security culture.  Culture is the shared attitudes that encompass the beliefs, 
customs, knowledge, and practices that characterize an organization.  Organizations 
depend upon culture to provide stability, security, understanding, and the ability to 
respond to a given situation.55  DHS has not yet established a common culture within the 
department nor has it established a national homeland security culture.  The agencies that 
moved into the department have retained their legacy identities with little alignment of 
organization values and control.  GAO continues to identify DHS’ transformation as high 
risk due to the challenges of implementing effective processes, developing partnerships, 
and establishing the management capacity to transform twenty-two agencies into one 
department.56   
Homeland security is a shared responsibility.  DHS must be focused on enterprise 
solutions that actively engage state and local governments and the private sector in their 
implementation.57  The homeland security culture should build a sense of shared 
responsibility among individuals, communities, the private sector, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), faith-based groups, and Federal, State, and local governments.  
DHS currently lacks the capability to effectively engage state and local governments in 
planning, information sharing, and analysis.  The regional structure would allow DHS 
leadership to align DHS with Federal, state, and local partners to develop homeland 
security culture by providing clear, concise messages about the culture, attributes, and 
behaviors desired and how to create them. 
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III. FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL COORDINATION 
A. BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS 
The Gilmore Commission posed the question: “If local responders are in fact our 
first line of defense, have we succeeded in effectively empowering and enhancing State 
and local capabilities?”58 
The United Sates Constitution assigns responsibility for public health and safety 
to the state governments.  When an incident occurs, the resources of the local 
governments are used first to manage the incident.  Local police, fire, and emergency 
medical services are usually sufficient to respond to small scale incidents.  If the incident 
is beyond the capabilities of local government, or local resources become overwhelmed, 
the local government will request assistance from the state.  Likewise, the state 
government may request assistance from the Federal government.  DHS needs the ability 
to look at these homeland security issues from the perspective of state and local first 
responders. 
Homeland security activities require close coordination between the Federal 
government and state and local governments in order to efficiently and effectively 
manage risk and allocate resources.  Activities at each level affect the other levels.  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) seeks to strengthen the 
preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic 
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by establishing mechanisms to 
improve the delivery of federal preparedness assistance to state, local, and tribal 
governments.  The principles of federalism, however,  limit the Federal government’s 
ability to mandate actions to state and local governments.  The regional structure is 
intended to develop partnerships to facilitate and coordinate homeland security efforts 
across jurisdictions within the region.   
There continues to be a lack of understanding between the Federal government 
and state and local governments about their roles in the national strategy.59  DHS needs 
                                                 
58 Gilmore Commission, The Fifth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory 
Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(Arlington, VA.: RAND, 2003). 
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to design and execute to coordinate the national strategy to coordinate required resources 
and to empower state and local governments to meet preparedness requirements of an all-
hazards approach to homeland security.  The operational response to a fast-moving 
disaster such as Katrina or 9/11 simply cannot be managed from Washington.  It must be 
done on the ground, and must be led by individuals who are intimately familiar with the 
affected region.60  It will require establishment of unified command, control, and 
coordination on the ground at the scene, for success.  The current structure is too 
fragmented to allow this to occur. 
State and local governments are looking for support and have high expectations of 
DHS to improve coordination between Federal, state, and local government, streamline 
the grant application process, consolidate training courses and programs, and equipment 
programs.61  The International Association of Chief’s of Police (IACP) contends that The 
National Homeland Security Strategy is flawed because it was developed by the Federal 
government, rather than by all levels of government.62  As a result, the strategy does not 
reflect a full presentation of national homeland security threats, vulnerabilities, and risks.   
In support of the Gilmore Commission, RAND Corporation conducted three 
waves of surveys, which when taken together provide data on the planning and 
preparedness activities of first responder communities from just prior to the September 11 
attacks through the fall of 2003.  The data provide a snapshot of the issues state and local 
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70-80% expect DHS to… Improve coordination, information sharing, and communication between 
Federal/State/local levels 
60-70% expect DHS to… Streamline grant application process across Federal grant programs 
50-60% expect DHS to… Standardize the grant application process across Federal agencies and 
consolidate multiple grant application requirements 
40-60% expect DHS to… Establish single point of contact at Federal level for information on 
available programs 
Provide primary contact at federal level instead of many on training, 
equipment, planning and other critical needs 
45-60% expect DHS to… Provide intelligence information and more detailed guidance on terrorist 
threat 
40-60% expect DHS to… Consolidate numerous training courses/programs and numerous 
equipment programs 
40-60% expect DHS to… Provide better, standardized templates and /or guidance to help with 
planning 
30-40% expect DHS to… Improve integration between public and private-sector efforts to 
improve defenses against terrorism and protect critical infrastructure 
30-40% expect DHS to… Help conduct threat assessment for jurisdiction or region 
Table 1.   In What Ways Do State/Local Responders Expect the DHS to Impact Them?63 
 
Emergency management follows the tiered structure established by the 
Constitution.  Local authorities are responsible for incidents that occur within their 
jurisdiction.  The state supports incidents which are beyond the capability of local 
responders or cross multiple jurisdictions.  The Federal government provides the final 
layer of response capability.  The layered approach provides a consistent commitment of 
resources that improve the ability of all levels of government to prevent terrorist attacks 
and to respond and recover effectively to the full range of threats faced by the nation.64 
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On average the Federal government requires 72 hours in order to marshal national 
assets to respond to a major incident.65  When a catastrophic incident immediately 
overwhelms state and local resources, as occurred following Hurricane Katrina, a 72 hour 
delay in establishing a coordinated response can have serious consequences.66  
Developing regional response plans that integrate response requirements across all levels 
of government prior to an incident would reduce the delay in moving federal resources.  
Regional plans would identify state and local capabilities and anticipated gaps that need 
to be filled by federal resources, closing the 72-hour gap between the beginning of a 
major incident and the arrival national assets. 
State governments provide the second response layer.  Emergency Management 
Assistance Compacts (EMAC) agreements coordinate interstate resources that can help to 
sustain state and local response efforts until federal assistance arrives.  Regional 
operations would facilitate the use of federal assets in the region during routine incidents 
strengthening the concepts of regional and multi-jurisdictional response into day-to-day 
emergency response operations.  Regional planning coordination would allow Federal 
government resources to be pre-identified to fill state and local shortfalls and be quickly 
mustered to provide support during incidents that are beyond state and local capabilities.  
Additional federal resources would be coordinated through regional and national 
coordination centers. 
The widespread damage caused by catastrophic incidents is generally regional in 
character, crossing multiple jurisdictions.  A regional structure that marries preparedness, 
contingency planning, and incident management is all the more essential to confront 
catastrophic incidents.67  DHS Regional Homeland Security Directors would be 
responsible for preparing for and responding to such incidents in the impacted region.  
Facilitating pre-incident interaction among emergency managers and federal, state, local 
officials builds trust and alleviates the problem of “exchanging business cards during a 
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disaster.”  Pre-established relationships make regional and multi-jurisdictional response 
during catastrophic events much less of a foreign concept. 
Regionalization of preparedness and response functions among states and local 
governments serves to leverage scarce governmental preparedness funds, reduce 
duplication of effort and expenditure of limited resources.  Successful regionalization 
must recognize that many effective efforts emanate from the bottom up.  Regional 
offices, therefore, will need take into account and build upon existing regional 
collaborations at the state and local levels. Each regional office should develop a network 
of mutual aid agreements with the states within the region, so that federal resources can 
be deployed from the regional offices in support of emergency response activities that do 
not rise to the level of major disasters, emergencies, or other incidents of national 
significance.  Each regional office would facilitate the development of regional mutual 
aid relationships within the geographic regions, including the development of regional 
response memorandums and interstate EMAC agreements.  
The regional structure would provide state and local authorities with a single point 
of contact for federal support that is intimately familiar with the capabilities and needs 
within the region. This information will have been gained through careful multi-
jurisdictional contingency planning and training, as well as through personal relationships 
with the lead state and local governments. 
B. COMMUNICATIONS 
GAO recommended that the Federal government provide support for developing 
(1) a national database of interoperable communication frequencies, (2) a common 
nomenclature for those frequencies, (3) a national architecture that identifies 
communications requirements and technical standards, and (4) statewide interoperable 
communications plans.68 
According to John Steinbit, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 
Information Integration, in a net-centric world all of the information is posted on the 
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network and users pull the information they require.69  Jack Zavin, Chief of Information 
Interoperability for DOD, believes net-centricity empowers users with the ability to easily 
discover, access, integrate, correlate and fuse information and data that support their 
mission objectives.70  Fusion Centers facilitate a daily exchange of information between 
homeland security entities at the federal, state and local government levels.  In 
conjunction with the Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Information Fusion Centers would 
provide a regional risk assessment to provide specific threat information to state and local 
governments.  The development of a layered approach to information sharing, fusing 
federal, state and local information and intelligence at the regional level provides another 
opportunity to identify potential terrorist activity and provide actionable information to 
law enforcement authorities. 
The national strategy must develop a standardized and effective process for 
sharing information and intelligence among all stakeholders.  The system should be 
capable of moving actionable information to the broadest possible audience allowing for 
heightened security with minimal economic and social consequences.71  
C. PLANNING 
I think that we dropped the ball long before Katrina hit by not doing the kind of 
catastrophic disaster planning that the Federal government should have been doing.72 
A significant factor in the Federal government’s failure to respond adequately to 
Hurricane Katrina was the lack of a credible federal process for developing and 
coordinating contingency planning across levels of government.  Effective response 
coordination requires contingency planning in advance of an incident.  Contingency 
planning drives the resource allocation, training, exercises, and evaluations, which enable  
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a rapid regional response.  Thus, hurricane Katrina highlighted the need to train 
operations personnel for evacuation, continuity of government, and restoring critical 
infrastructure.73 
Hurricane Katrina also pointed out the weakness in the regional planning and 
coordination structures as a flaw in the national preparedness system.74  Coordinating 
operational planning efforts across multiple levels of government agency jurisdictions is 
one of the most significant challenges facing national preparedness efforts.  Contingency 
planning efforts should be directed at pre-identifying federal, state, and local resources 
and capabilities that will be required to respond to incidents in the region.  The enormity 
of preparedness planning challenges requires a coordinated effort across all levels of 
government.  Collaboration, communication, integration, process management, and the 
aggregation of multiple layers of planning will be required to prepare for incidents of 
national significance. 
The national planning strategy should build strong preparedness and readiness 
capabilities across federal, state and local boundaries with corresponding processes that 
provide an enterprise-wide capacity to plan equip, train, and exercise against measurable 
standards.75  Preparedness requires operational planning that coordinates information 
flow and interoperability across multiple levels of organizations responsible for 
responding to emerging threats and incidents.  Coordinating federal, state, and local 
incident response requires a standard approach to: 
• Manage a coordinated regional response across multiple agencies and 
levels of government; 
• Allow responders to share information through a common operational 
picture; 
• Coordinate operational procedures and policies; 
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• Identify available response capabilities; and 
• Provide interoperable equipment. 
HSPD-8 directs the Secretary to coordinate with state and local government 
officials to establish equipment standards that support national preparedness capabilities.  
Standardizing preparedness efforts across multiple jurisdictions that have separate 
budgetary and local priorities presents a significant challenge.  As the focal point for 
preparedness and emergency planning, DHS needs to understand local and state 
government priorities and capabilities in order to properly develop federal preparedness 
plans.  Regional planning efforts will help to gain awareness of specific resources 
available across multiple agencies, jurisdictions, and governments.  Agency specific 
policies and procedures could then be coordinated to meet standard operating guidelines 
for ease of integration into a larger response capability. 
Preparedness planning in federal, state, and local agencies needs to work across 
agency jurisdictions to develop, exercise, and modify contingency plans.  Bringing 
together representatives from each level of government provides a means to integrate 
individually developed plans.  Most planning efforts require the ability to develop 
incremental plans that are easily scalable to integrate across multiple levels of 
government to respond to large scale and complex incidents.  State and local 
governments require the capability to contribute to Federal planning efforts while 
maintaining responsibility for their own planning efforts.  Planners at the federal level 
need to understand the vulnerabilities, capabilities, and organization of state and local 
governments and first responder agencies to properly prepare federal response plans. For 
example, in rural areas there are few responders and they are required to respond to all 
incidents, including terrorism.  State and local governments do not have sufficient staff 
and resources to accomplish the requisite planning and preparedness activities to attain a 
viable readiness posture for a large to catastrophic disaster. 76 
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IV. SHORTFALLS OF A CENTRALIZED FEDERAL APPROACH 
TO HOMELAND SECURITY 
Following the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina, homeland security observers 
have reached a near consensus that the current DHS organization for state and local 
coordination exceeds the effective span of control to be managed centrally from DHS 
headquarters.  It is clear from reports following Katrina that we must strengthen the 
emergency management system—that means strengthening the Federal, state and local 
capabilities.77  In particular, DHS requires the ability to identify the federal resources 
needed to support state and local emergency managers.  While responsibility for national 
security rests with the Federal government, the precepts of federalism make every level 
of government and region of the country both a contributor to, and responsible for, 
homeland security.78  As a result, understanding state and local prevention and response 
capabilities, organizations, threats, vulnerabilities, and politics is an essential element to 
planning a homeland security strategy.   
Federalism creates a fundamental, systematic tension in a national planning 
framework.  On the one hand, State and local governments have different needs, 
conditions, and requirements and require flexibility to shape their preparedness and 
emergency response programs to best meet their concerns.79  On the other hand, the 
Federal government has a strong interest in centralization.  The Homeland Security 
Operation Center (HSOC), for instance, serves as the primary hub for domestic incident 
management, operational coordination, and situational awareness for the entire country.  
The HSOC’s responsibility for fusing homeland security information from across the 
nation, however, currently has no national network to coordinate intelligence and 
information sharing from the state and local level.  All that data, and it analysis and 
interpretation occurs only at the federal level.  The consequence is predictable.  Based 
upon personal observations in the HSOC, the fusion of homeland security information 
across the nation is inconsistent and few states fuse information across the many 
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emergency management disciplines.  Without any integration mechanisms to synthesize 
relevant homeland security information at a lower level, the HSOC is bound to miss 
relevant information that could prevent a terrorist attack.  Information overload causes 
relevant information to get lost among the volumes of information received.  At the same 
time, when information exchange happens only infrequently the process and protocols for 
managing information are ignored or forgotten.80 
This systemic tension between decentralization among states and local 
governments and the centralization of federal operational responsibility continues to 
obstruct the Department’s efforts to successfully establish itself as a single primary point 
of contact for state and local governments.  DHS component agencies have maintained 
their pre-existing field structures and continue to coordinate independently with state and 
local governments.  The diverse construction of the federal agency field structures, 
including the misaligned field structures of DHS component agencies, continues to create 
confusion and miscommunications with state and local officials.  Efforts to coordinate 
homeland security functions across the Department have resulted in the transfer or shared 
responsibility among DHS Headquarters and component agencies.  Since moving into 
DHS, FEMA’s planning and coordination responsibilities have been shared by other 
offices and agencies in the Department.81  As a result, FEMA regional offices are no 
longer a single point of contact for state and local emergency managers.   
Given these tensions and problems, this chapter will examine how reform for the 
DHS regional structure would significantly improve homeland security preparedness.  In 
particular, a new regional structure would be able to coordinate DHS functions and 
information through senior leadership positions located regionally where they are closer 
to state and local officials.  A regional office would provide state and local officials a 
single point of contact to coordinate training, equipment, planning, exercises and other 
critical homeland security missions within the region. It would also coordinate homeland 
security grant programs to enhance the regional preparedness of firefighters, police, and 
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emergency medical personnel and evaluate state and local preparedness activities and 
equipment against the National Preparedness Goal. 
A. HOMELAND SECURITY ORGANIZATION 
The nature of American society and the federalist structure of American 
governance make it difficult to achieve the goal of securing the country through the 
Federal government alone.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 
established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the largest government 
reorganization since World War II.  The creation of DHS establishes a single agency 
focused on protecting the United States from terrorism and other hazards.  Homeland 
security, however, is a shared responsibility and partnership between more than 87,000 
federal, state and local jurisdictions.82  Coordinating homeland security across this vast 
array of jurisdictions will require the Department to develop partnerships that promote 
collaboration across all levels of government and develop strong state and local 
capabilities. 
The National Homeland Security Strategy calls for an integrated strategy 
connecting all levels of government in collaborative effort.  DHS provides state and local 
governments a single federal agency to coordinate homeland security functions.  
Homeland security efforts such as infrastructure protection require close coordination to 
conduct vulnerability assessments, strategic planning, and training and exercises.  In 
order to provide better coordination with state and local governments, the DHS Office of 
Infrastructure established Protective Security Advisors in high risk cities throughout the 
country.  Likewise during an incident of national significance the Federal government 
must be prepared to augment state and local response and recovery efforts.  The nature of 
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1. Establishing DHS 
The Homeland Security Act established the Department with four directorates, 
each lead by an Undersecretary to coordinate the twenty-two agencies that moved into 
DHS:83 
• Border and Transportation Security 
• Emergency Preparedness and Response 
• Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures 
• Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
DHS also brought together federal programs to provide assistance to state and 
local governments for domestic disaster preparedness training of first responders and 
coordination of the government’s disaster response efforts.  As part of the single agency 
focus, Congress and the President tasked DHS to integrate the federal interagency 
emergency response plans into a single, comprehensive, government-wide plan, and 
ensure that all response personnel have the equipment and capability to communicate 
with each other as necessary. 
A number of grant programs were consolidated into the newly created 
department.  The Department became the administrator for federal grant programs for 
firefighters, police, and emergency personnel.  The Office for Domestic Preparedness, 
which was established in the Justice Department to develop and administer training and 
equipment programs to assist state and local governments, became part of the newly 
established Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness within 
the Office of the Secretary of Homeland Security.84  ODP had the primary responsibility 
within the Federal government to prepare the country to respond to acts of terrorism, 
including the following:85 
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• Coordinate preparedness efforts at the Federal level, and work with all 
State, and local emergency response providers on all matters pertaining to 
combating terrorism, including training, exercises, and equipment support. 
• Coordinate or, as appropriate, consolidate communications and systems of 
communications relating to homeland security at all levels of government. 
• Direct and supervise terrorism preparedness grant programs of the Federal 
government for all emergency response providers. 
• Incorporate homeland security priorities into planning guidance on an 
agency level for the preparedness efforts of the Office for Domestic 
Preparedness. 
• Provide agency-specific training for agents and analysts within the 
Department, other agencies, and State and local agencies, and international 
entities. 
• As the lead executive branch agency for preparedness of the United States 
for acts of terrorism, cooperate closely with the FEMA, which has the 
primary responsibility within the executive branch to prepare for and 
mitigate the effects of non-terrorist-related disasters in the United States. 
• Assist and support the Secretary, in coordination with other Directorates 
and entities outside the Department, in conducting appropriate risk 
analysis and risk management activities of State, and local governments 
consistent with the mission and functions of the Directorate. 
• Supervise those elements of the Office of National Preparedness of FEMA 
that relate to terrorism, pursuant to Section 430 of the Act. 
The Department also consolidated the state and local coordination functions of 
other federal agencies.  The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) moved 
into the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate.  FEMA is responsible for 
providing a comprehensive, risk-based, all-hazards emergency management program of 
preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery.  Many of the state and local liaison 
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programs and all grant programs previously operated out of the FEMA regional offices 
were also moved to DHS headquarters.86  EP&R and FEMA were charged with 
providing the Federal government’s response to terrorist attacks and major disasters, 
including:87 
• Managing the federal response; 
• Directing the Domestic Emergency Support Team, the Strategic National 
Stockpile, the National Disaster Medical System, and the Nuclear Incident 
Response Team; 
• Overseeing the Metropolitan Medical Response System; 
• Coordinating other Federal response resources in the event of a terrorist 
attack or major disaster. 
• Aiding the recovery from terrorist attacks and major disasters; 
• Building a comprehensive national incident management system with 
Federal, State, and local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, 
to respond to such attacks and disasters. 
• Consolidating existing Federal government emergency response plans into 
a single, coordinated national response plan; and 
• Developing comprehensive programs for developing inter-operative 
communications technology, and helping to ensure that emergency 
response providers acquire such technology. 
Providing intelligence and warning from the Federal government to state and 
local governments is a primary function of the Federal government’s homeland security 
strategy.  The Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Analysis (IA) is responsible for 
sharing law enforcement information and intelligence-related information relating to 
homeland security with state and local officials.  In conjunction with the Assistant 
Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, IA integrates intelligence, critical infrastructure 
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and key asset information to develop vulnerability assessments and risk analysis in order 
to identify protective security measures for federal, state, and local governments.88 
A regional field structure is missing from the Department of Homeland Security 
organization.  Section 706 of the Homeland Security Act requires that not more than one 
year after enactment of the Act, DHS shall submit a plan for consolidating and co-
locating regional offices.89  Congress did not specify the functional requirements for the 
regional structure.  Although it appears the intent was twofold: 1) consolidate offices to 
alleviate duplication of effort and save money; and 2) provide a full array of DHS 
functions under one roof.  Currently DHS field functions are scattered throughout the 
component agency field offices.  DHS headquarters provides the only single point of 
contact homeland security for 87,000 state and local jurisdictions. 
2. Second Stage Review (2SR) 
Shortly after becoming the Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, 
announced his intention to review the department’s organizations and policies in order to 
establish the best organization to meet the Department’s missions.  The guiding principle 
of the review, he announced, was that “DHS must base its work on priorities driven by 
risk.  Our goal is to maximize our security, but not security at any price. Our security 
regime must promote Americans’ freedom, prosperity, mobility, and individual 
privacy.”90 
In July 2005, Secretary Chertoff announced his six-point agenda to align the 
Department’s policies, operations, and structures to address potential threats to the 
nations.  The six-point agenda will:91 
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• Increase overall preparedness, particularly for catastrophic events;  
• Create better transportation security systems to move people and cargo 
more securely and efficiently;  
• Strengthen border security and interior enforcement and reform 
immigration processes;  
• Enhance information sharing with our partners;  
• Improve DHS financial management, human resource development, 
procurement and information technology; and  
• Realign the DHS organization to maximize mission performance.  
The Second Stage Review established the Preparedness Directorate to coordinate 
preparedness measures with state and local governments based on risk.  The Preparedness 
Directorate works with state and local governments to identify threats and vulnerabilities 
and develop protective measures to manage the risk to critical infrastructure and key 
assets.  The Preparedness Directorate:92 
• Consolidates preparedness assets across the Department; 
• Facilitates grants and oversees nationwide preparedness efforts by 
supporting first responder training, citizen awareness, public health, 
infrastructure and cyber security and ensures proper steps are taken to 
protect high-risk targets; 
• Focuses on cyber security and telecommunications; 
• Addresses threats to our nation’s public health through the Chief Medical 
Officer, who coordinates preparedness efforts against biological attacks; 
and  
• Is responsible for infrastructure protection, training and exercises, the U.S. 
Fire Administration, and the Office of National Capitol Region 
Coordination.  
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The Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, which 
previously assisted states and local governments to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorist 
acts, was incorporated into the Office of Grants and Training (G&T) within the 
Preparedness Directorate.  G&T provides assistance through federal funding, coordinated 
training, exercises, equipment acquisition, and technical assistance.  The Office of State 
and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness was merged into the Preparedness 
Directorate under the Office of Grants and Training as part of the 2SR reorganization.   
The Second Stage Review does not address the establishment of a regional 
organization.  DHS is structured as a headquarters organization with a centralized 
management approach.  Within the Department, the current organization has at least 
twenty-six direct reports to the Secretary within the Department.  Coordinating homeland 
security with the states and territories adds another fifty six principals who coordinate 
directly with the Secretary.  The current organization does not appear to provide the 
capability to adequately facilitate state and local coordination. 
The diversity of emergency management agencies and the complexity of 
coordinating homeland security functions across multiple layers of government suggest 
the need for a narrower span of control than is available from DHS headquarters.  
Increasing the span of control and flattening organizational structures, however, can 
increase efficiency by creating better communication flow and decreasing internal 
competition.93  Decentralizing functions also provides the opportunity to flatten the 
organization.  Establishing a regional office to coordinate among five to seven states 
provides the span of control needed for the diversity and complexity of coordinating 
homeland security functions, while decreasing the direct reports to the Secretary by 
decentralizing the state and local coordination functions. 
B. UNCOORDINATED RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA 
One of the lessons to be learned from the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina is 
that Washington can not answer all of the homeland security needs of the Nation, 
especially in response to a catastrophic disaster.94  “Washington can be expected to lead, 
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but we cannot, nor should not, micro-manage the protection of our country. Instead, it 
must be a priority in every city, every neighborhood, and every home across America.”95  
James Jay Carafano of the Heritage Institute argues that federal efforts are not sufficient, 
they are designed to support, not supplant state and local efforts.96  The uncoordinated 
and unorganized federal response to Hurricane Katrina resulted from a lack of situational 
awareness and coordination at all levels of government.  The Federal Response to 
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned identified several flaws in the national preparedness 
effort which would not have existed if there had been closer coordination between 
federal, state, and local governments prior to the hurricane.97  The White House report 
identified the following flaws:  
• Lack of reliable situation reports 
• Failure to establish a unified command 
• Lack of coordination or knowledge of preparedness plans 
• Lack of a coordinated federal response 
• Insufficient regional planning and coordination 
Katrina affected an area over 90,000 square miles, disrupted the lives of millions 
and destroyed or degraded most of the region’s infrastructure.98  The extent of the 
disaster presented an unprecedented challenge to emergency responders all levels of 
government.  State and local agencies are the first line of defense in protecting their 
communities, not only from terrorism but also natural disasters and other emergencies.99  
State and local emergency managers and first responders, however, struggled to maintain 
control of the incident until federal resources arrive.   
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Hurricane Katrina quickly exhausted state and local resources.  The extent of the 
devastation also limited the available assistance from surrounding emergency 
management agencies.  The lack of communication and situational awareness left state 
and local government leaders unable to determine response priorities.  There was not a 
total picture of the situation on the ground, the capabilities that were on the way, the 
missions that had been resourced, or the missions that still needed to be completed.100  As 
Department of Defense assets arrived in the days following Katrina, there was confusion 
about the military roles and responsibilities and command and control of National Guard 
forces.  The military’s efforts to respond quickly and effectively to Hurricane Katrina 
were further hampered by a lack of timely damage assessment, communications 
problems, and lack of overall situational awareness.101   
C. WHAT IS LACKING? 
A regional organization could have significantly contributed to improving 
coordination for catastrophic disasters.102  State and local coordination from DHS 
headquarters does not appear to provide DHS officials the ability to become familiar with 
the peculiar needs of state and local governments within their jurisdictions areas.103  
Likewise, DHS officials are not familiar with state and local capabilities.  No one knows 
the needs of their hometown communities better than the local leaders, first responders, 
and emergency personnel. These hometowns must be actively engaged for homeland 
security to work.104  Pre-identifying state and local capabilities and anticipated gaps that 
require federal assets would help to speed deployment, thereby closing the average 72-
hour gap between the beginning of a major incident and the arrival of federal assets.   
The centralized organization of DHS limits national homeland security 
coordination.  DHS appears to be out of touch with state and local homeland security 
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planning and resource requirements.  The regional offices would consolidate and 
synchronize preparedness functions at the field level.  FEMA’s primary responsibility is 
to coordinate the federal agencies during response and recovery.  FEMA maintained its 
regional structure after moving into DHS, however, FEMA’s planning and coordination 
capabilities and responsibilities were moved to other DHS offices.105  G&T distributes 
grants to support state and local homeland security efforts, but is not in apposition to 
evaluate regional capabilities.  The department has the responsibility to coordinate all 
aspects of homeland security.  In 2004 GAO reported that federal emergency 
preparedness grants were often spent without consideration of whether the assets and 
resources being purchased were available in neighboring jurisdictions and could be 
shared.106  In response to problems encountered during Katrina, DOD recognized the 
need for better coordination and will be assigning specially trained defense department 
personnel at FEMA regional offices to coordinate with DHS and state and local 
officials.107 
DHS field offices for instance, would be well-placed to overcome the 
fragmentation of responsibilities and capabilities between states, local, and Federal 
governments during strategy development and planning.  They would provide federal 
leadership in coordinating effective, unified national strategies that, according to the 
Gilmore Commission, require radical changes in attitudes and culture to bring the diverse 
agencies and security disciplines together to move from broad conceptual principles to 
organizational plans.108  To date, coordination and oversight of homeland security efforts 
at the Federal level has yielded limited success.  Centralizing efforts at the federal level 
has not engaged state and local governments in order to coordinate strategies or the 
sharing of homeland security information.  DHS headquarters has not yet synthesized 
efforts to eliminate duplication of effort among government entities and has not 
successfully integrated homeland security functions across levels of governments. 
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V. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES 
A. FACILTATING THE NATIONAL STRATEGY THROUGH A REGIONAL 
APPROACH TO HOMELAND SECURITY 
From the early days of DHS’ formation, a regional structure of governance for 
homeland security has been one of the primary options considered by Congressional and 
executive Branch officials.  The first Secretary of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, was a 
proponent of DHS regions.  DHS, more than any other cabinet agency, depends upon the 
integration of people, capabilities, and information to achieve its mission.109  Regional 
offices would position the Department closer to the people who are the first line of 
defense thereby strengthening the critical connections.110  As envisioned by some in 
these early debates, DHS would be responsive to state and local variations in risks and 
needs if it developed regional offices in order to facilitate a unified national effort.  The 
DHS region’s primary role would be to effectively coordinate and integrate homeland 
security functions across the nation.  According to some observers, recent preparedness 
problems underscore the point that regionalizing our national preparedness system would 
be the very linchpin that connects all of the elements of our preparedness and 
response.111 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland 
Security and tasked the Secretary of Homeland Security to coordinate homeland security 
with state and local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, and with the private 
sector.112  The Act also required DHS to submit a plan to Congress for consolidating the 
regional offices of agencies transferred to the Department.  The Act did not, however, 
provide specific guidelines for a regional structure or identify the purpose of the regional 
organization.113  The Department developed a plan for establishing regions, however, 
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according to former DHS Secretary Tom Ridge the plan is sitting on the shelf.114  The 
consolidation and relocation of the regional offices of the agencies that moved into DHS 
was too political and never made it to Congress.115  The result has been that DHS 
continues to rely upon personnel in Washington, D.C. to coordinate with state and local 
governments throughout the country. 
There is a surprising consensus as to the need for a regional DHS structure, shared 
by the drafters of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the first Secretary of Homeland 
Security, the White House, the House of Representatives Select Bipartisan Committee, 
the Senate Committee for Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and scholars 
and policy experts from across the political and intellectual spectrum, as well as state, 
local, and private sector leaders. Katrina has strengthened that consensus.116 
According to many homeland security experts, coordination and integration of 
federal, state, and local homeland security functions will achieve a higher level of 
preparedness nationwide than if each area was left to pursue their own plans and 
duplicate resources and capabilities.  DHS regions will be able to provide a coordinated 
homeland security capability to more rapidly respond to threats and incidents where and 
when it is needed.  The DHS regions, this near consensus view maintains, would provide 
a structure to coordinate homeland security capability to more rapidly respond to threats 
and incidents where and when it is needed. 
DHS began developing a regional strategy over two years ago, but has yet to 
execute that strategy.  Previous efforts to evaluate a DHS regional structure have focused 
on the region being the integration point for DHS component agency operations.  
Focusing inwardly, however, fails to meet DHS’s fundamental mission requirement.   
Emphasizing the integration of DHS operations misses the opportunity to better engage 
the state and local governments that are the heart of Homeland Security.  The state and 
local levels, where the majority of homeland security activities take place, provides the 
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best opportunities for integration of homeland security efforts.  Could the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11 have been avoided if state law enforcement officers had been able to access 
federal information identifying Mohammed Atta as a suspected terrorist?  DHS should 
shift the focus of the regional concept to assist state and local governments in the 
development of prevention, preparedness, and response and recovery activities. 
In the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the President recognized the 
crucial role of state and local governments in providing for homeland security.  The 
traditions of federalism in the United States require that organizations outside of the 
Federal government take the lead in many homeland security initiatives.117 
B. FEDERAL REGIONS 
The United States has a history of administering federal activities through 
regional structures in an attempt to standardize the delivery of federal programs to the 
states.  President Nixon designated ten Standard Federal Regions for domestic 
departments and agencies as part of his government reorganization plan in 1969.  The 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) established the regional organization in OMB 
Circular A-105, “Standard Federal Regions” in April, 1974.  Standard Federal Regions 
were established to achieve more uniformity in the geographic jurisdictions of Federal 
field offices. Standard regions provided a basis for promoting more systematic 
coordination among agencies and federal, state, and local governments and for securing 
management improvements and economies through greater interagency and 
intergovernmental cooperation.118  OMB Circular A-105, provides guidance on the 
policies and requirements governing the regions.  Although the circular was rescinded in 
1995 as part of the Reinventing Government effort, a number of Federal agencies closely 
align with the standard federal regions. 
Under OMB Circular A-105, regional boundaries and regional headquarters cities 
were established for ten regions.  Federal agencies were required to adopt the uniform 
system when organizational changes were proposed or new offices established.  The 
standard federal regions were: 
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• Region I: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode 
Island, Vermont  
• Region II: New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands  
• Region III: Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia  
• Region IV: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee  
• Region V: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin  
• Region VI: Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Texas, Oklahoma  
• Region VII: Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska  
• Region VIII: Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, 
Wyoming  
• Region IX: Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada (American Samoa, 
Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands)  
• Region X: Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Washington  
 
Figure 1.   Standard Federal Regional Boundaries119                                                  
119 Wikipedia, List of Regions of the United States.  
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Within DHS, FEMA and the Coast Guard and several other legacy agencies 
maintain regional structures.  Both agencies can trace these structures to predecessor 
organizations.  The boundaries and number of regions have changed, through out the 
history of each agency based on organizational needs.  FEMA’s regional boundaries 
reflect the standard federal regions established by President Nixon. 
1. FEMA Organization 
From the establishment of the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) in 1941, a 
regional structure has been used to administer Federal government civil defense and 
emergency management activities.  When it was originally established OCD functioned 
through eight regional offices strategically located throughout the continental United 
States.  This regional structure evolved through a variety of changes in civil defense and 
emergency management organizations.  OCD worked closely with state and local 
governments to develop their capability to take effective action in during emergencies.  In 
1961 the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) was established to oversee 
nonmilitary emergency preparedness programs.  OCD coordinated its functions with OEP 
and other federal agencies having emergency management responsibilities. Civil defense 
and emergency management were based on the premise that state, and local governments 
respond first and federal assets supplemented the response when required.120  OEP was 
abolished in 1972 and the regional structure was increased to ten regions with the 
creation of the Civil Defense Preparedness Agency.121   
The Director of FEMA was authorized to establish regional offices as necessary 
to carryout its mission.122  The agency adapted the OEP regional structure when it was 
established in 1979.  FEMA maintained its regional structure after moving into DHS.  
The ten regional offices, which implement FEMA policies at the regional level, are 
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responsible for liaison with other federal agencies, and state and local governments.123  
The Regional Directors recommend changes in the implementation of FEMA policies 
and improvements to procedures.  The primary mission of the regional office is respond 
to and recovery from disasters.   
In a catastrophic disaster, FEMA coordinates the federal response, working with 
twenty-eight federal partners and the American Red Cross to provide emergency food 
and water, medical supplies and services, search and rescue operations, transportation 
assistance, environmental assessment, and more.124  The FEMA region initiates the 
Federal response to a disaster and coordinates federal response and recovery missions. 
2. U.S. Coast Guard Organization 
The Coast Guard evolved through the incorporation of five federal agencies: the 
Revenue Cutter Service, the Lighthouse Service, the Steamboat Inspection Service, the 
Bureau of Navigation, and the Lifesaving Service.  These agencies were shuffled around 
the government and were finally united as the Coast Guard in 1939.  The multiple 
missions and responsibilities of the modern Service are directly tied to this diverse 
heritage and the magnificent achievements of all of these agencies.125 
The Coast Guard traces its district structure back to the establishment of the 
Lighthouse Board in 1852.  The Secretary of the Treasury as the president of the Board 
was authorized to elect a chairman and to divide the coast of the United States into twelve 
lighthouse districts.  An army or navy officer was assigned to each district as the 
lighthouse inspector.126  In April 1946 the Coast Guard created the Eastern, Western, and 
Pacific Area commands to coordinate cases that required the assets of more than one 
district.  In January 1973, the Coast Guard renamed the Eastern and Western areas the 
Atlantic and Pacific areas, respectively.  The Coast Guard currently maintains nine 
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Districts, each led by a Coast Guard Flag officer.  The District Commander is responsible 
for all Coast Guard operations within their area of operation.  In addition, two Area 
Commanders oversee the operations of the Districts. 
Coast Guard operations, are often unpredictable and emergent in nature, 
sometimes requiring teamwork among multiple Coast Guard units or with other 
government agencies.127  The Coast Guard pushes the authority and responsibility for 
incident management to the lowest level where situations can best be handled allowing 
the person on scene to assess the situation, seize the initiative, and take the action 
necessary for success.128  Dealing with external agencies requires an understanding of 
roles and authorities.  In some situations the Coast Guard does not have final authority 
and may need to consult with other authorities for decisions.  Coast Guard units maintain 
a high degree of flexibility and readiness in order to meet changing operational 
requirements.  As a result, the Coast Guard creates synergies among both internal and 
external partners.   
The Coast Guard established a reputation for being Semper Paratus, “always 
ready” to meet just about any maritime challenge by successfully and repeatedly adapting 
to the situation at hand.129  Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard 
looked to reorganize unit level operations to create unity of command in America’s ports, 
better align field command structures, and improve operational effectiveness.  The Coast 
Guard began to establish Sector Commands by integrating Groups, Marine Safety Offices 
(MSO), Vessel Traffic Services (VTS), and in some cases, Air Stations.  These multi-
mission commands will operate within each of the Coast Guard Districts. 
C. REGIONAL ALTERNATIVES 
Following Hurricane Katrina, discussions about a regional structure have 
resurfaced.  As an interim measure Secretary Chertoff pre-designated five hurricane 
response teams consisting of a Principal Federal Official (PFO), Deputy (PFO), and 
Federal Coordinating Officer to prepare for the 2006 hurricane season.  These teams 
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began working with state and local officials prior to hurricane season to prepare a 
proactive coordinated response.  This chapter will look at three potential organizational 
structures to facilitate coordination of hurricane and all-hazards preparedness in the 
future.  The options to be discussed for coordinating homeland security among federal, 
state, and local governments are: 1) maintaining coordination from DHS headquarters; 2) 
establishing a DHS regional structure; and 3) establishing Federal Preparedness 
Coordinators in high risk metropolitan areas. 
1. DHS Headquarters Structure  
The DHS Headquarters Structure would maintain coordination and oversight of 
homeland security efforts at the Federal government level with coordination through the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Headquarters.  The Preparedness Directorate is 
responsible for preparing state and local governments for disasters.  The Directorate 
brings together policy, planning, exercise, and evaluation resources to develop to meet 
the requirements of federal, state, and local responders.  As the integrator for 
preparedness, the Directorate is responsible for synchronization and integration of 
national preparedness initiatives. 
Maintaining the DHS headquarters structure centralizes the development of 
national policy and the coordination and integration of homeland security missions in 
Washington D.C.  State and local officials have expressed concern that the Federal 
government does not understand the unique concerns inherent to their localities.  
According to Eric Holdeman, Director of the King County Washington Emergency 
Operations Office, having DHS regions in place coordinating homeland security would 
be the single most important thing to improve readiness.130   
In order to coordinate with the states from DHS headquarters, the Secretary must 
deal with fifty states and six territories.  This is in addition to an already extensive span of 
control appears to be overwhelming for the current headquarters structure.  The 
Directorate needs the capability to identify cross jurisdictional capability requirements 
based on regional risk for all hazards incidents.  Coordinating the preparedness 
requirements of state and local governments will require a robust staff to work with state 
and local planners.                                                    
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As currently structured DHS does not appear to have the ability to liaise with 
assigned state governments on a regular basis to identify existing capabilities to 
coordinate filling resource gaps through multi-jurisdictional agreements, acquisition of 
resources, or federal assistance.  Maintaining regular, near daily, contact with state and 
local officials will allow DHS to develop a better understanding of contingency plans and 
capabilities.  Senator Daniel Akaka of Hawaii believes that a permanent, consolidated 
office in the Gulf Region would have established stronger relationship between DHS and 
state and local officials by providing one point of contact.131  Arizona has been a leader 
in regionally focused security planning.  In 2003, Governor Janet Napolitano began 
focusing on developing formal protocols to facilitate multi-agency coordination.132 
This alternative does not address the requirement to co-locate or consolidate the 
current the field and regional offices of the agencies that moved into the Department.  
Several of the agencies have regional structures and continue to operate as independent 
agencies with their own geographic boundaries.  DHS component agencies have 
developed their own coordination and operational ties with state and local authorities.  As 
a result, state and local officials may be required to coordinate with multiple DHS agency 
directors on homeland security issues.  The leadership in each region varies by 
component agency.   
Coordination and oversight of homeland security efforts at the DHS headquarters 
level has yielded limited success.  Centralizing efforts at the Federal level has not 
engaged state and local governments in order to coordinate strategies or the sharing of 
homeland security information.  The headquarters structure has not yet synthesized 
efforts to eliminate duplication of effort among government entities.  DHS continues to 
use the headquarters structure, however, has not successfully integrated homeland 
security functions. 
2. Regional Structure 
Establish a regional structure with field staff coordinating with states to facilitate 
homeland security initiatives among groups of agencies and governments in geographic 
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regions throughout the nation.  Programs operating out of regional offices develop closer 
relationships among all levels of government, providing for stronger relationships at all 
levels.133  The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs in 
their report concluded that state and local officials knew they did not have sufficient 
resources prior to the land fall of Hurricane Katrina, but did not communicate those needs 
to the Federal government.134  Neither DHS nor FEMA had developed a relationship 
with state and local officials to identify and correct resource or planning shortfalls.  The 
committee believes that FEMA’s relationship with state and local officials had eroded as 
a result of preparedness grants being transferred to other portions of DHS.135  The 
regional offices will play a significant planning, coordinating, and steering role for their 
region. 
A regional structure would allow DHS to engage state and local governments on a 
daily basis to coordinate strategies and share homeland security information based on the 
highest probability threats to a geographic region.  Threats and incidents often occur in 
local areas and require local incident management.  State and local prevention, 
preparedness, and response capabilities are the first line of defense.  HSPD-8 directed 
federal agencies to improve the delivery of assistance through a single point of contact.  
DHS, however, continues to maintain multiple points of contact.  The ability to 
coordinate with state and local governments on a regular basis will develop up a better 
understanding of state and local needs within the region.  DHS field personnel would be 
located within or near state and local offices, whereas, maintaining coordination form 
DHS headquarters limits the ability to develop such relationships due to the travel 
required to meet regularly.  During an incident, the regional staff would draw upon 
regional equipment and resources outside of the incident area in order to support response 
operations. 
Establishing a regional structure would allow DHS to engage state and local 
governments to coordinate strategies and share homeland security information.  
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Additional costs would be incurred in establishing and staffing regional offices and 
would be dependent upon the number of regions established.  The Regional Homeland 
Security Director would be able to review resources within the region and facilitate 
agreements between government entities to more efficiently utilize assets.  
Implementation would require Congressional approval and funding. 
3. UASI Structure 
DHS is currently developing a plan to coordinate homeland security initiatives 
with local governments through a DHS staff assigned to high risk areas using the Urban 
Area Security Initiative (UASI) cities.  Establishing a structure in these UASI cities 
would concentrate homeland security activities in the areas of the country identified as at 
the highest risk.  The coordination of effort in the UASI cities would likely yield the most 
effective means of contingency planning and sharing information.  DHS personnel 
assigned to each city would review resources within the defined area and facilitate 
agreements between government entities to more efficiently utilize assets, evaluate 
requests for resources, and coordinate the use of Federal resources.  
The DHS plan calls for establishing a Federal Preparedness Coordinators (FPC) in 
eleven UASI cities to coordinate homeland security prevention and preparedness efforts 
in the nation’s highest risk areas.  The FPCs will be responsible for facilitating the 
development of integrated contingency plans, exercises, and information sharing 
initiatives for each UASI area.  Each FPC will have a small staff to coordinate planning, 
training and exercises, and administration.  In addition, each component agency in the 
area will detail personnel as subject matter experts to coordinate DHS prevention and 
response capabilities in the area.   
The FPC structure would provide many of the same benefits as the regional 
structure by more closely coordinating with local governments.  Using the UASI areas, 
however, bypasses State governments and concentrates homeland security activities at 
the municipal level.  The location of UASI cities leaves major coverage gaps across the 
country, leaving many states without a homeland coordination structure.  Establishing the 
FPC in the FEMA Regional offices, without a clear delineation of functions, may lead to 
further confusion over who is in charge.   
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Establishing a structure in each of the UASI cities would concentrate homeland 
security in the areas of the country identified as at the highest risk.  The coordination of 
effort in the UASI cities would likely yield the most effective means of contingency 
planning and sharing information.  The cost of establishing DHS offices to facilitate 
homeland security efforts in all of the UASI cities, however, may be prohibitive.  There 
would also be a potential decrease in efficiency as a result of duplicate initiatives in 
closely located cities.  Implementation would require Congressional approval and a 
substantial increase in funding to support the additional DHS resources.  Establishing 
FPCs in the FEMA regional offices may be a good opportunity to provide an initial 
operating capability and evaluate more closely evaluate the regional staffing 
requirements. 
C. RECOMMENDATION 
Establishing a DHS regional structure provides the greatest opportunity to 
coordinate Federal, State, and local homeland security activities nation wide.  A regional 
structure would provide a homeland security network of interconnected Federal, State, 
and local agencies capable of synthesizing information and planning efforts that provide 
strategic, operational, and tactical integration of efforts at all levels of government to 
detect, deter, and defend against future terrorist attacks.  The Regional Homeland 
Security Director would serve as the DHS point of contact for homeland security issues 
and facilitate the development of regional strategies and plans with state and local 
governments within the region.  Each region would have a regional staff to provide direct 
assistance with contingency planning and outreach to engage government and private 
sector entities in prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery agreements.  The 
regional office would coordinate the sharing of homeland security information and 
evaluate threat information to prevent future terrorist incidents. 
This option provides the capability for DHS to more directly engage state, local, 
and tribal governments in preparedness by utilizing the current FEMA regional structure.  
It is believed that this structure will: 
• Facilitate development of a strategy to coordinate federal, state, and local 
cooperation during incidents of national significance;   
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• Reduce the confusion of integrating federal, state, and local preparedness 
and response;   
• Eliminate the delay in federal, state, and local response; and 
• Raise the federal sensitivity to state and local requests for assistance. 
D. REGIONAL FUNCTIONS 
The DHS regional organization would enhance homeland security coordination 
and leadership at the state and local levels in six strategic areas: building partnerships; 
planning and analysis; situational awareness; preparedness; communications and 
coordination; and grant programs. 
1. Partnership 
The National Preparedness Guidance, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
8: National Preparedness, states, “As we develop Federal assistance programs in FY 
2006 and beyond, our focus will be to leverage our homeland security resources in order 
to achieve the highest possible readiness.”136   
Partnerships provide a means to coordinate needed capabilities quickly and 
effectively while reducing overall resource costs.  Jurisdictions should leverage resources 
of surrounding agencies to increase response capabilities with increased economies of 
scale.  Equipment tailored to various jurisdictional capabilities promotes consistency, 
efficiency and interoperability when planning and developing protocols involved in tiered 
regional response.137  Partnering provides the ability to close capability gaps through 
resource sharing and access to needed expertise that has already been mastered.138  
According to Michael Brown, the partnerships between FEMA and state and local 
governments have been broken.139 
Homeland security activities require close coordination between the Federal 
government and state and local governments in order to efficiently and effectively 
manage risk and allocate resources.  The principles of federalism limit the Federal 
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government’s ability to mandate actions to state and local governments, the regional 
structure is intended to develop partnerships to facilitate and coordinate homeland 
security efforts within the region.  Involvement of state and local officials in the 
regionalization process, engages them as true partners, not simply outsiders trying to 
access the system.140  DHS needs to consult directly with external stakeholders, including 
Congress, federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector, in the 
strategic planning process. 
“Homeland security is about relationships - whether we are talking about 
responding to hurricanes and fires or the work of terrorists.  Public servants at all levels 
of government cannot accomplish the goals of preparedness and response if they are not 
familiar with the people with whom they have to work and the area and the people they 
need to serve.  The clear delineation of responsibilities and trust are critical to deploying 
the response and recovery plan.  Intergovernmental coordination will improve the 
preparedness and response to disasters and thereby mitigate the losses incurred; thus 
helping to maintain viable communities and an economically sound nation.”141 
The Regional Homeland Security Director would serve as the primary point of 
contact for homeland security initiatives within the region and develop the regional 
homeland security strategy in conjunction with state and local partners.  Regionalization 
provides state and local governments “one-stop shopping” for federal homeland security 
assistance.  The Regional Homeland Security Director would broaden the focus of the 
existing FEMA Regional Interagency Steering Committees (RISCs) to manage risk and 
allocate resources, provide regular forums and communications channels to exchange 
information, coordinate federal assistance to state and local governments, coordinate 
assistance and participation in training and exercise programs, and coordinate 
information and intelligence sharing within the region.  The Regional Homeland Security 
Director will be also be immersed in the day-to-day activities within the region, and as a 
result will be more familiar will regional capabilities, infrastructure, and resource 
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requirements.  The DHS regional structure would improve overall awareness of 
intergovernmental planning and communications with regional partners. 
The regional structure provides DHS the ability to better facilitate state and local 
government partnerships to prepare for any kind of disaster by coordinating federal, state, 
and local plans; making resources available for facilities and equipment; providing 
emergency personnel training; supporting multi-jurisdictional exercises, and sharing 
information with state and local officials. 
2. Planning and Analysis 
Hurricane Katrina reinforced the need for the Federal government to work with 
homeland security partners to revise existing plans to ensure a functional operational 
structure, including within regions.142  Many state and local governments have been 
overwhelmed by the new requirements for homeland security within their jurisdictions.  
One of the major benefits of establishing homeland security regions is the ability to 
provide federal support for planning and analysis to state and local governments.  
Typically, federal assistance is financial, however, the Federal government may be asked 
to mobilize resources from any number of federal agencies assist.  A proactive federal 
response can create strains on federal resources and presents practical challenges for 
federal responders who are not familiar with local capabilities or infrastructure.143  The 
interaction between DHS regional staff and state and local officials will create a better 
understanding of capabilities allowing a measured proactive federal response.   
Homeland security is a shared responsibility of numerous partners, including 
other federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector.  Taking into 
account the primary homeland security role state and local governments have as first 
responders, DHS must involve nonfederal stakeholders in the strategic planning process. 
The DHS regional concept provides an organizational structure to improve homeland 
security through the coordination of Federal, State, local, and private sector organizations 
in an array of functions, with the states having the lead role in the planning and DHS 
coordinating Federal assistance to fill resource gaps.  Several states have complained that 
DHS is ignoring state officials when drawing up their response plans.  Some emergency 
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experts in California and Washington State are concerned that DHS is pushing a one-
size-fits-all approach to disaster response that may be well-suited to hurricanes on the 
Eastern seaboard but could be irrelevant for Western states facing the possibility of 
earthquakes and tsunamis.144  FEMA does not have the ability to focus on all the nation’s 
disaster risks at the same time.  All-hazards planning should be coordinated through DHS 
at the regional level in conjunction with state and local planners. 
The Regional Homeland Security Director, in conjunction with the State 
Homeland Security Advisors, would develop a regional homeland security strategy based 
on a regional risk assessment.  The Regional Staff would provide state and local 
governments support to develop effective and efficient integrated contingency plans 
based on the regional strategy, risk assessment, and threat analysis.  Regional 
contingency planning would provide a consistent process for developing and analyzing 
scenario-based contingency plans.  Contingency plans would be based on a regional 
construct to geographically define scenario-based plans and to provide the capability to 
develop integrated incident response plans that reflect homeland security strategic goals 
and preparedness and response capabilities at each level of government.  Effective and 
efficient contingency planning would: 
• Enhance incident commanders ability to put the right resources in the right 
place, at the right time; 
• Improve interoperability and synergy of resources and identify regional 
resource gaps; 
• Provide a centralized review and approval process to ensure plans are 
consistent with policy and doctrine; and 
• Develop agreements for integrated response capabilities within the region.   
The Regional Homeland Security Director would coordinate with state and local 
governments and the DHS component agency leadership within the region, or the 
Principal Federal Official (PFO) if designated during an incident response, to meet 
regional resource requirements.  Regional planning efforts would identify gaps in 
prevention, preparedness, and response and recovery capabilities and pursue acquisition 
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of required homeland security resources through federal funding or use of federal assets.  
The grant process would be tied to the regional homeland security strategy and resource 
gap analysis to provide a more risk based grant formula.  The DHS regional structure 
links DHS capabilities in the region together to enhance federal support to state and local 
governments and facilitate rapid response to incidents. 
3. Situational Awareness 
One of the primary functions of DHS is the gathering and analysis of information.  
The National Response Plan established the Homeland Security Operation Center 
(HSOC)145 as the primary hub for domestic incident management, operational 
coordination, and situational awareness.  The HSOC is currently responsible for fusing 
homeland security information for the nation.  As a result homeland security information 
integration currently occurs only at the federal, HSOC, level.  The fusion of homeland 
security information at the state and local level is inconsistent and normally exists only 
for law enforcement information.  Without any integration mechanisms to synthesize 
relevant homeland security information at a lower level, the HSOC is bound to miss 
relevant information that could prevent a terrorist attack.  In testimony before the 9/11 
Commission, Richard Andrews noted, the result of information overload causes relevant 
information to tends to get lost among the volumes of information received, conversely 
when information exchange happens only infrequently the process and protocols  for 
managing information are ignored or forgotten146  
As part of the regional structure DHS would establish Regional HSOCs 
(RHSOC), to coordinate information and intelligence sharing between the Federal 
government and state and local governments and serve as information spokes to better 
evaluate threat information to prevent future terrorist incidents.  The RHSOC would 
focus on state and local intelligence and threat information in order to prevent terrorist 
activities in the region.  The RHSOC would share knowledge of current capabilities and  
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emerging critical needs by maintaining an integrated common operational picture to 
provide regional leaders and incident response units current information on incidents and 
resources within the region.   
The RHSOC would develop and maintain situational awareness of regional threat 
and activities for decision making.   Establishing the RHSOC facilitates a daily exchange 
of information between homeland security entities at the federal, state, and local 
government levels.  A layered approach to information sharing, fusing federal, state, and 
local information and intelligence at the regional level provides another opportunity to 
identify potential terrorist activity and provide actionable information to law enforcement 
authorities. 
The RHSOC would be a key resource in developing and maintaining situational 
awareness during periods of increased threat and during an incident response.  Situational 
awareness provides the baseline for senior leadership to make strategic level decisions 
required to coordinate support for emergency responders.  Strategic level decisions often 
impact the success of the incident response. 
4. Preparedness 
Preparedness ensures that if a disaster occurs, people are ready to get through it 
safely, and respond to it effectively.  Preparedness involves developing action plans, 
training of emergency responders, development and exercise of policy and procedures, 
acquisition and maintenance of emergency response equipment.  The Nation will be 
better prepared to respond to and recover from the impacts of all types of hazards by 
using established national emergency management standards, developed collaboratively 
among emergency managers, emergency response personnel, and leadership from all 
levels of government.147 
The Regional Homeland Security Director would facilitate the coordination of 
preparedness programs including a regional training and exercise program for all-hazards 
preparedness.  The regional preparedness program would provide federal support to state 
and local governments to meet national preparedness program goals and federal 
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participation in training and exercises.  Regional preparedness would be based on the 
principles of the National Incident Management System, the National Response Plan, the 
National Planning Scenarios, and the Interim National Preparedness Goal.   
The Regional Homeland Security Director would be responsible for overseeing 
and supporting regional preparedness evaluations and assessments to assist in regional 
contingency planning and gap analysis.  The Regional Homeland Security Director would 
facilitate resource sharing within the region through the use of memorandums of 
agreement and memorandums of understanding between regional partners.  In testimony 
before the House, Secretary Chertoff stated, “Congress and the department allocate tens 
of even hundreds of millions of dollars to each state and to certain local governments 
across the country without the prerequisite analysis of risk.”148  Regional evaluations and 
risk assessments would provide the Regional Homeland Security Director the ability to 
provide guidance to state and local governments on resource requirements within the 
region in order to tie the grant process to the regional strategy to ensure efficient and 
effective allocation of homeland security assets and monitor the grant process within the 
region. 
The regional homeland security preparedness program would facilitate the 
coordination of state and local assets for regional prevention, preparedness, and response 
and recovery. 
5. Communication and Coordination 
The Regional Homeland Security Director must fully engage in communications 
with state and local government leaders.  State and local governments require the 
capability to identify emerging threats and share that information across all levels of 
government to prevent and prepare for terrorist attacks.  The Regional Homeland 
Security Director would be the primary DHS representative for homeland security 
stakeholders in the region to facilitate information sharing and threat assessment, develop 
regional plans, planning for National Special Security Events and Homeland Security 
Special Events, and to coordinate federal assistance as required.  The Regional Homeland 
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Security Director would maintain connectivity to key regional stakeholders through a 
regional communications network.  The Regional Homeland Security Director would 
coordinate strategic risk assessments, scenario-based contingency planning, grant 
program assessments, training programs and exercises.  The Regional Homeland Security 
Director would facilitate requests for Federal assistance from state and local governments 
and with the PFO during Incidents of National Significance, National Security Special 
Events, and Homeland Security Special Events.   
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 3 (HSPD-3) established the Homeland 
Security Alert System (HSAS) to “inform and facilitate decisions appropriate to different 
levels of government and to private citizens at home and at work.”149  State and local 
governments have indicated continuing confusion regarding the recommendations for 
heightened security measures and clearly defined and consistently applied 
communication policies and procedures have not been used when changing HSAS alert 
levels.150  The RHSOC would facilitate communication to regional partners concerning 
changes in the HSAS levels regarding the risk of terrorist acts and other threats to 
Federal, State and local entities and communicate the implementation of protective 
measures to meet increased security levels.  In conjunction with the Joint Terrorism Task 
Force, the RHSOC would provide a regional risk assessment to provide specific threat 
information to State and local governments.  The Regional Staff would assist State and 
local government to identify appropriate protective measures to implement in response to 
the threat. 
6. Grant Programs 
The Regional Homeland Security Director would serve as the senior federal 
official responsible for federal preparedness and response activities within the region.  
The regional headquarters would serve as the focal point for federal efforts to facilitate 
regional preparedness—including the initial evaluation of homeland security grant 
funding requests. 
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Grants are frequently used as federal tools for improving state and local response 
capabilities.  The method of distribution of federal funds, how grants are structured and 
how they share responsibilities between federal, state, and local governments can affect 
how successful these programs are at implementing homeland security programs.  The 
Regional Homeland Security Director will be responsible for reviewing grant application 
to determine if they support the Regional Homeland Security Strategy.  The Regional 
Homeland Security Director will not have the authority to deny a grant.  The Regional 
Homeland Security Director will also be responsible for evaluating the grant expenditure 
within the region. 
E. THE NEED FOR DHS REGIONS 
Homeland security is a shared responsibility of numerous partners, including 
other federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector.  Taking into 
account the primary homeland security role state and local governments have as first 
responders, DHS must involve nonfederal stakeholders in the strategic planning process. 
The DHS regional concept provides an organizational structure to improve homeland 
security through the coordination of Federal, State, local, and private sector organizations 
in an array of functions, with the states having the lead role in the planning and DHS 
coordinating Federal assistance to fill resource gaps.  “This structure needs to be in place 
now, before another event, so that working relationships have not only been forged but 
cemented, trust has been built, and plans have been exercised, tested, and revamped 
according to lessons learned. A regional approach best serves these ends.”151 
America needs to develop a culture of preparedness.  DHS’ efforts to enhance 
national preparedness at the local level have not had significant impact.  Headquarters 
level programs will not effectively reach the local level.  The department needs to refocus 
its programs to empower state and local governments to create effective “bottom-up” 
preparedness from individuals and communities.152 
DHS needs to consult directly with external stakeholders, including Congress, 
federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector, in its next strategic 
planning process.  “Homeland security is about relationships - whether we are talking 
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about responding to hurricanes and fires or the work of terrorists. Public servants at all 
levels of government cannot accomplish the goals of preparedness and response if they 
are not familiar with the people with whom they have to work and the area and the people 
they need to serve. The clear delineation of responsibilities and trust are critical to 
deploying the response and recovery plan.  Intergovernmental coordination will improve 
the preparedness and response to disasters and thereby mitigate the losses incurred; thus 
helping to maintain viable communities and an economically sound nation.”153 
Historically, the American governance system, divided into federal, state and 
local jurisdictions, does not provide a natural vehicle for discussing public policy issues 
from a regional, multi-jurisdictional perspective. The autonomy of local jurisdictions and 
competing priorities within and among them makes regional coordination difficult. 
Efforts that seek to overcome these challenges to coordinate regionally must take into 
account the different operational structures and civic traditions of states and 
municipalities.154 
Establishing a common DHS regional structure would enable the Department to 
develop homeland security culture among DHS component field elements and State and 
local governments.  DHS component agencies maintain their pre-existing field structures 
without common operational boundaries, goals, or missions from DHS.  Component 
agencies and other Federal Departments and agencies continue to coordinate 
independently with State and local governments lending continued confusion over roles 
and responsibilities.  The uncoordinated response to Hurricane Katrina highlighted the 
lack of understanding of State and local requirements at the Headquarters level.   
The DHS field structure provides the opportunity for DHS to gain a better 
understanding of homeland security activities at the State and local level.  The regional 
teams would enhance relationships with local governments, assist with regional planning 
and exercises, and be prepared to manage and coordinate responses to incidents and be 
more effective in monitoring homeland security grant spending.155  The DHS field 
structure would allow the development of a DHS culture beyond headquarters, by                                                  
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establishing senior DHS field representatives and a single point of contact for homeland 
security within specific geographic areas or regions.  Establishing a field structure would 
also provide the opportunity for the Department to align component agency boundaries to 
better coordinate homeland security activities.  Proposed DHS Regional Roles: 
• Facilitate coordination of Federal, state, and local homeland security 
activities;  
• Decrease span of control requirement for DHS headquarters; and 
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VI. ESTABLISHING A DHS REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The autonomy of state and local jurisdictions and competing priorities within and 
among them makes regional coordination difficult.  Efforts that seek to overcome these 
challenges to coordinate regionally must take into account the different operational 
structures and civic traditions of states and municipalities.156  Unlike the previous DHS 
regional concept, which sought to integrate DHS component operations, this strategy 
focuses on coordination with state and local agencies.  The primary effort of DHS in 
establishing a regional strategy should be the development of external partnerships with 
state and local governments. 
Regionalization arouses concerns of losing influence and decision making 
authority over local resources.  According to Aristotle, politics stems from a diversity of 
interests.  Consistent with Aristotle’s conceptualization, it is given that, federal, state, and 
local governments bring their own interests, wants, desires, and needs to the table.157  
The previous effort to establish DHS regions met with political adversity on two fronts: 
1) DHS component leadership was concerned about losing operational control of their 
forces; and 2) the political competition for the DHS regional offices presented a win or 
lose proposition for political leadership.  According to James Carafano the regional issue, 
“was so political you couldn’t really discuss it.”158 
General William C. Moore, former coordinator for military support to federal and 
state authorities, suggested that a regional structure needed to be focused on three axes: 
(1) structure, with FEMA as a player, but not predominant, (2) requirements, in terms of 
what needs to be delivered, and (3) means.  He recommended that the new DHS regional 
headquarters be at the confluence of these three axes, arguing that “you can’t turn a 
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Katrina over to a FEMA…DHS has to be there to coordinate.”159   The DHS coordination 
role is one of the missing components needed to establish the National Homeland 
Security Strategy. 
DHS Regional Goals: 
1. Build and sustain effective homeland security partnerships and 
coordination mechanisms across all levels of government. 
2. Provide a foundation for continuously improving national preparedness. 
3. Promote a national homeland security culture that incorporates 
organizational excellence and support for all levels of government. 
4. Establish and maintain a national homeland security planning system. 
5. Establish agreements to ensure efficient use of resources for homeland 
security missions. 
6. Coordinate sharing of homeland security information to prevent, prepare 
for, respond to, and recover from terrorist incidents and natural disasters.  
B. ESTABLISHING THE FOUNDATION 
Initial DHS Regional planning will take place in the DHS Preparedness 
Directorate.  The National Preparedness Task Force will act as the program manager for 
implementing the regional concept.  The Task Force will work closely with internal 
partners; Office of State and Local Coordination, Office of Operations, Office of Policy, 
U.S. Emergency Management Authority, and Management Directorate to establish 
personnel, facility, budget, and operating requirements.  The newly established National 
Preparedness Task Force will be responsible for implementing the FPC program and will 
provide Headquarters oversight of the program.  The Task Force will develop program 
evaluation and criteria for the FPC program for further development of a DHS regional 
structure.  Successful implementation of the FPC concept should be evaluated for 
expansion to coordinate regional homeland security missions.   
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The Undersecretary of Preparedness will be responsible for the establishment and 
general oversight of the regional structure.  The National Preparedness Task Force within 
the Preparedness Directorate will provide day-to-day program management and policy 
development for the regions.  The Task Force will coordinate regional program 
management with the DHS operational elements, the Office of State and Local 
Government and Contingency Preparedness, and other DHS and federal organizations as 
the situation dictates.  As the program manager for the regions the Task Force will: 
• Develop policies and procedures to seamlessly integrate information 
sharing and preparedness activities on a day-to-day basis 
• Establish standards for regional training and exercises 
• Provide baselines for the development Regional homeland security 
strategies 
• Develop an integrated contingency planning program to support regional 
strategies 
• Develop a regional preparedness assessment program 
• Integrate regional strategies and capabilities into the DHS Homeland 
Security strategy and planning process 
• Develop formal training and education program for regional staffs 
• Coordinate cross regional contingency planning 
The National Preparedness Task Force will engage state and local governments in 
the proposed regions to establish working agreements in support of the regional standup.   
In order to prepare for the establishment of homeland security regions, DHS 
should: 
• Establish a Regional Task Force composed of Federal, state, and local 
leadership directed by politically adept adviser to lead the regional effort. 
• Separate DHS leadership positions from component leadership positions.  
Establish regional leadership as DHS Senior Executive Service positions.  
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Component agency personnel detailed to DHS often have underlying 
allegiance to their home agency. 
• Develop regional planning efforts to embrace the concept of sharing 
Federal, state, and local resources to best meet the response requirements 
for homeland security missions.   
• Organize DHS Regional Offices to work in partnership with state, and 
local governments and other first responders to ensure coordination and 
integration of regional preparedness, response, mitigation, and recovery 
activities. 
• Establish Regional Advisory Counsels composed of Federal, state, and 
local officials, emergency managers, emergency response and support 
providers to coordinate homeland security activities. 
• Establish a Federal Homeland Security Partners Steering Committee in 
each region to identify federal resources to meet state and local shortfalls; 
and to coordinate information fusion/sharing from federal resources in 
conjunction with the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF); 
• Establish a State and Local Homeland Security Steering Committee in 
each region to develop jurisdictional homeland security strategies and 
operational plans based on regional strategy; identify capabilities and 
resource gaps; coordinate state and local information fusion/sharing; and 
identify state and local critical infrastructure 
• Broaden the focus of the existing FEMA Regional Interagency Steering 
Committees (RISCs) to manage risk and allocate resources, and provide 
regular forums and communications channels to exchange information.   
DHS component agencies are currently maintaining several legacy regional 
structures.  Creating a common regional structure would provide the opportunity to better 
coordinate DHS operations and leverage current DHS field assets in the establishment of 
the DHS regions. 
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To help ensure multi-jurisdictional readiness in advance of an Incident of 
National Significance, DHS Regional Staff will have day-to-day coordination 
responsibilities with state and local governments related to preparedness, planning, and 
coordination within their assigned geographic areas of responsibility.  These duties 
include: 
 
FUNCTION DHS REGIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 
Partnership • Build relationships with key stakeholders (DHS operational elements, other 
Federal agencies, State and local government officials, and the private sector) 
Planning and 
Analysis 
• Coordinate the review of contingency and continuity of operations plans to 
report on the status of catastrophic planning of state and local governments in 
their assigned region 
• Coordinate local area Federal support for designated Level I and Level II 
Homeland Security Special Events occurring within the region 
• Coordinate resource and operational planning in preparation for incident 
response in concert with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 




• Maintain situational awareness of available resources and capabilities, existing 
operations, and possible threats in the region 
Preparedness 
Assessments 
• Assess the status of preparedness in their area of responsibility according to 
guidance provided by the Secretary and U/S for Preparedness 
Communication 
and Coordination 
• Serve as the communications focal point for DHS in the region 
• Facilitate homeland security-related information sharing among federal, state, 
and local governments 
Grants and 
Training 
• In reviewer for homeland security grants 
• Coordinate planning for, and participate in, local, regional, and national-level 
homeland security exercises, training, and drills 
Table 2.   DHS Regional Responsibilities 
 
C. REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 
The DHS Regional concept should build upon the foundation of the FEMA 
Regional Offices.  The FEMA regions, established along the guidelines of the Standard 
Federal Regions, provide a recognized geographic distribution of federal agency 
responsibilities.  FEMA was created to coordinate the federal response to a disaster that 
overwhelmed the resources or was beyond the capabilities of state and local 
governments.  The agency is also responsible for distributing disaster recovery funds.  
FEMA, however, does not have the ability to carry out the homeland security mission in 
the field by itself.  The FEMA Regions do not have sufficient staffing capability to 
support a Regional Response Coordinating Center (RRCC) and a full Emergency 
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Response Team (ERT) simultaneously.160  FEMA will maintain its regional offices and 
continue to be responsible for coordinating response and recovery under the Stafford Act.  
The FEMA regional organization will remain in place for the most part under the 
guidance of a Regional Administrator. 
DHS headquarters will focus on national policy, while the regions focus on 
coordinating and integrating DHS missions with state and local governments.  Under this 
proposal, DHS will establish a Regional Office, collocated with FEMA to develop and 
coordinate implementation of the homeland security strategy within the region.  Building 
upon FEMA’s existing structure with ten regional offices, the DHS Regions would be a 
key entity in building relationships with State and local governments.  A DHS regional 
organization would help establish a single point of contact to provide guidance and 
assistance to state and local officials.  The regional offices will focus on coordinating 
state and local security and preparedness efforts.  DHS headquarters will also focus on 
coordinating the operations of the Department’s component agencies.  The DHS regional 
structure will provide a mechanism for DHS to align component agency operations 
within defined geographic areas to allow development of regional homeland security 
strategies.  This proposal anticipates that DHS component agencies will align to the 
regional boundaries. 
The DHS regional leadership would be able to better identify the needs of the 
states within each region to coordinate homeland security initiatives to integrate federal, 
state and local efforts.  The Regional Homeland Security Director will serve as the 
primary point of contact for homeland security initiatives within the region and will 
develop the regional homeland security strategy in conjunction with state and local 
partners.  The Regional Homeland Security Director will be responsible for preparedness 
and prevention and initiating federal response and recovery operations. 
Integrating the national homeland security functions through the establishment of 
homeland security regions would help develop a unified effort across federal, state and 
local governments.  The DHS regional structure will centralize regional homeland 
security coordination at the regional office, while decentralizing headquarters functions 
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to the region decreasing the span of control at the headquarters level.  As a result, the 
regions would provide a more manageable span of control for the Secretary and provide 
the capability to more effectively reach out to state and local governments.   
DHS regions will allow closer coordination of federal, state and local roles, 
responsibilities and resources under the framework of the National Response Plan and the 
National Incident Management System.  The regional organization would help DHS 
develop closer working relationships with first responders who best understand the local 
relationships agreements, laws and available resources to coordinate communication, 
decision making and integrated response to threats and incidents.  Secretary Ridge’s 
strategy for DHS included engaging partners and stakeholders from federal, state, local, 
tribal and international governments.161   
The regional structure would be especially beneficial to remote and rural 
jurisdictions which are often overlooked in the allocation of homeland security funding.  
Local governments do not have the capability to protect or respond to incidents at critical 
infrastructure, such a railroads and nuclear power plants, located in these areas.  
Developing a single federal point of contact to work with state and local government 
officials will alleviate confusion in the allocation of federal funds and help to ensure 
critical infrastructure in less populated areas is protected. 
The establishment of a Homeland Security Regional Structure would achieve the 
DHS Mission of leading a unified national effort to secure America.  Effective threat and 
incident response requires dedicated, locally based senior leadership from DHS to 
coordinate a network of Federal, state, and local partners that plan, train, respond and 
share information together on a routine basis.  The homeland security regions will 
provide federal support to state and local governments that have been overwhelmed by 
new requirements for homeland security within their jurisdictions.  The DHS regional 
staff will oversee integrated preparedness efforts to include all-hazards contingency 
planning and continuity of operations planning, exercises and drills, information sharing, 
and strategic partnering.  Regional coordination will include leveraging existing  
 
                                                 
161 DHS, “Securing Our Homeland.”   
76 
preparedness efforts and collaborative relationships, DHS component field resources and 
program resources within the region when developing, refining, and expanding programs 
and activities. 
1. The Regional Homeland Security Director 
The Regional Homeland Security Director will serve as the personal 
representative of the Secretary of Homeland Security to facilitate and coordinate 
homeland security initiatives within the region.  The Regional Homeland Security 
Director will be from the DHS Senior Executive Service.  The Regional Homeland 
Security Director develops the regional homeland security strategy and plans that support 
the National Strategy for Homeland Security.  The Regional Homeland Security Director 
will be responsible for coordinating homeland security efforts across all levels of 
government within the region.  The State Homeland Security Advisor will normally be 
the primary point of contact for Regional Homeland Security Director, although some 
situations may require the Governor to serve as the primary point of contact.  Contacts 
with local governments within each state should be coordinated through the Homeland 
Security Advisor unless permission has been provided for direct contact with local 
governments.  The Regional Homeland Security Director’s functions include the 
following: 
1. Represent the Secretary for HLS activities in the region. 
2. Prepare to serve as PFO during an Incident of National Significance by: 
a. Pre-selecting potential Joint Field Office sites;  
b. Building relationships with potential members of a PFO cell; and 
c. Conducting regular drills to insure that communication would be 
maintained during an incident. 
3. Maintain integrated situational awareness of available resources and 
capabilities, existing operations, and possible threats in metropolitan area. 
4. Participate in exercises in the role of the PFO. 
5. Coordinate contingency planning in the region. 
77 
6. Coordinated Federal support to special event planning that occurs in the 
region. 
7. Develop a Regional Homeland Security Strategy for the region and 
provide input into state and local Homeland Security strategies in the 
region. 
8. Create information sharing networks among key HLS stakeholders. 
9. Build relationships with stakeholders from DHS component agencies, 
members of other Federal agencies, and state and local officials. 
10. Provide a single DHS point of contact in the region. 
Establishing future coordination requirements and operational capabilities with 
state and local governments will be a primary responsibility of the Regional Homeland 
Security Director.  The Regional Homeland Security Director serves as the primary point 
of contact with federal, state, and local leadership within the region.  The Regional 
Homeland Security Director will not have directive control over DHS component agency 
or state and local assets.  DHS brought together many organizations with established 
relationships to state and local governments.  Component agencies will leverage existing 
relationships with federal, state, and local governments to support regional programs.  
Component agency liaisons will serve as the primary point of contact between the 
Regional Homeland Security Director and component agency leadership in the region.  
Component agency leaders in the region will integrate core functions and contingency 
planning into the Regional Homeland Security Strategy. 
The Regional Homeland Security Director would be responsible for all aspects of 
homeland security coordination within their region.  The Regional Homeland Security 
Director will coordinate homeland security planning with state and local officials within 
the region.  The Regional Homeland Security Director will be responsible for facilitating 
coordination of Federal, state, local, and tribal homeland security initiatives.  The 
Regional Homeland Security Director should serve as the DHS point of contact for State, 
local, and tribal governments within the region.  Each region should have a staff made up  
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of a mix of DHS employees and DHS component agency detailees.  A regional structure 
would enable DHS to provide a more integrated homeland security capability across all 
levels of government. 
2. The DHS Regional Staff 
The Regional Staff will provide technical and administrative support to state and 
local governments to develop prevention and preparedness plans.  The Regional Staff 
would also provide support for communications and coordination, contingency 
operations, planning and analysis, preparedness, training and exercises, and situational 
awareness.  A DHS Regional Structure would enhance homeland security coordination 
and leadership at the state and local levels in five strategic areas.  One of the primary 
responsibilities of the DHS regional staff is to help ensure multi-jurisdictional readiness.  
Readiness involves a continuous cycle of planning, training, exercising, evaluating, and 
initiating corrective and mitigation activities.   
The regional staff will enhance the ability to build and maintain positive 
relationships to coordinate integrated contingency plans, exercises, and information 
sharing initiatives for the region.  As the DHS representatives in the region, the regional 
staff will develop strategic relationships with DHS partners in the region. 
The regional staff will develop relationships with all DHS operations centers, 
state and local operations centers and intelligence fusion centers within the region.  
Regional staff will be assigned to the state operations center for each state in the region.  
The regional staff will coordinate information sharing between the Homeland Security 
Operations Center and state and local operation centers and intelligence fusion centers. 
The regional staff will represent DHS in dealings with state and local officials and 
the media within the region.  As the point of contact for DHS in the field, it is expected 
that the regional staff will receive frequent requests for information from the media.  The 
regional staff will coordinate with DHS headquarters to convey the regional and national 
homeland security picture.  The regional staff will also push regional media interest 
stories to DHS headquarters to showcase homeland security activities within the region. 
The regional staff will assist with coordinating federal assets for Level I and 
Level II Homeland Security Special Events.  The regional staff will facilitate federal 
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support to the event and coordinate Federal incident management and security assistance 
across the spectrum of prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery as appropriate.  
The regional staff responsibility for Homeland Security Special Events includes: 
• Serving as the Federal Coordinator for level I and Level II events; 
• Liaison with Federal, state, and local officials;  
• Consultation with state and local officials on event planning; 
• Development of the Federal Integrated Support Plan; 
• Assessment and evaluation of requests for Federal Assistance; and  
• Coordination of media inquiries. 
Each regional office would have personnel assigned to work with State and local 
governments to assist in the development of contingency plans, exercises, and resource 
requirements.  DHS personnel would be assigned to each State Emergency Operations 
Center to coordinate situational awareness between the State and the HSOC.   
The regional staff, in conjunction with state and local governments, will review 
existing contingency planning documentation and assist with integration of National 
Incident Management System requirements and identification of tasks and capabilities 
required to meet the National Preparedness Goal.  Regional preparedness, planning, and 
coordination activities include: 
a. Partnership - Building Regional Relationships 
In discussing the DHS regional concept, former Undersecretary of 
Homeland Security, Asa Hutchinson stated, “I think when you are talking about 
partnerships, when you are talking about improving our communication and messaging 
with our state and local partners, that if we had Regional Homeland Security Directors 
and moved in that direction, that that would be a tool that could be used to help us 
localize and communicate our message more effectively.”162  Previous discussions about 
establishing DHS regions focused on integrating DHS field operations.  Component 
agency concerns to loss of command and control of agency resources and restructuring of 
                                                 
162 U.S. Congress, House, DHS Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Conference Report on HR 
2360, testimony of Asa Hutchinson. 
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agency field resources resulted in resistance from senior leadership.  Shifting the DHS 
regional focus to coordinating multi-jurisdictional homeland security efforts will better 
enable the development of federal, state, and local partnerships.  Building multi-
jurisdictional partnerships within the regional structure will: 
• Redirect federal efforts toward pre-established missions to support state 
and local capabilities; 
• Facilitate day-to-day interactions with state and local partners; 
• Reduces DHS component agency concerns of DHS taking control of day-
to-day operations; 
• Enhance forums for homeland security coordination such as the monthly 
Homeland Security Partners meetings with federal, state, and local 
officials in Miami. 
• Integrate planning with state and local governments to better identify 
Federal homeland security support requirements.   
• Recognize leaders who successfully integrate Federal, state and, local 
planning efforts. 
• Utilize the National Preparedness Goal as the standard to work toward. 
b. Planning and Analysis 
Contingency planning is a responsibility of all levels of government.  
Building a layered contingency planning strategy will coordinate Federal, state, and local 
planning to identify capabilities and gaps at each level.  Planning has not kept pace with 
changes in organization (establishment of DHS) or emergency management requirements 
(NIMS and NRP).  Likewise, guidance for emergency planning has not been updated.  
Effective emergency planning requires the integration of plans at all levels of 
government.  Activities from each level impact the other levels and should be anticipated 
in contingency plans.  Emergency plans should identify know capabilities gaps at each 
level and appropriate resources should be identified to fill those gaps through resource 
acquisition or agreements with other jurisdictions or levels of government.  
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Good planning leads to good response.  Preparedness programs enable 
personnel to rapidly identify, evaluate, and react to a wide spectrum of situations, 
including increased threat levels and incidents arising from terrorism or natural events 
such as hurricanes.  State and local government officials have the overall responsibility of 
deciding and implementing the appropriate protective actions during periods of 
heightened security or response to an incident.  They are responsible for notifying the 
public to take protective actions such as evacuation, sheltering or other protective 
measures. 
Following Hurricane Katrina, the President directed DHS to conduct joint 
reviews of Emergency Operations Plans for major cities (defined as the Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI) areas by DHS).  Congress further directed DHS to report on 
the status of catastrophic planning including mass evacuation planning in all fifty state 
and the seventy-five largest urban areas.163  Although these efforts are scheduled to be 
completed prior to the establishment of a DHS regional structure, the regional staff will 
play a critical role in future planning efforts.  DHS contingency planning efforts will be 
directed toward: 
• Developing a collaborative planning process with state and local 
governments as partners; 
• Leveraging ongoing efforts such as the National Preparedness Goals, 
NIMS, and NRP; 
• Updating contingency planning guidance; 
• Improving understanding of each level’s response capabilities; 
• Identifying capability and resource gaps; 
• Coordinating assistance to fill capability and resource gaps through 
intergovernmental agreements or federal assistance; and 
• Improving synergy across all levels of government. 
 
                                                 
163 U.S. Congress, House, DHS Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Conference Report on HR 
2360. 
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c. Situational Awareness and Information Sharing 
Situational awareness is a fundamental element of preparedness.  The 
regional staff will be responsible for maintaining current situational awareness of 
vulnerabilities and risks facing the region and the status of federal, state, and local 
response capabilities.  Situational awareness includes coordinating information sharing of 
current threats, ongoing operations, capabilities, and resource needs to prevent, reduce 
vulnerability, respond to, and recover from incidents within the region. 
Effective incident management and threat response requires a network of 
stakeholders that share information, plan, train, exercise, and respond together.  Through 
contingency planning reviews, training and exercises, and development of strategic 
partnerships, the DHS regional staff will facilitate the information sharing environment 
between regional stakeholders.  In order to meet the information sharing and networking 
requirements to coordinate homeland security activities within the region, the regional 
staff will: 
• Coordinate information sharing with existing Federal, state, and local 
homeland security organizations and multi-agency coordination groups; 
• Identify partnerships that could be formed or could be improved; 
• Identify and promote best practices in information sharing; 
• Advocate for maximum shared situational awareness and a common 
operational picture among regional homeland security partners; 
• Promote state and local initiatives that create, improve, or maintain 
information sharing networks. 
d. Preparedness Assessments 
Reviewing contingency plans will allow regional staff to be well versed in 
the capabilities and needs of partners in the region.  DHS regional staff will be better 
aware of shortfalls in state and local resources and requirements for Federal assistance.  
Regional staff will consult and coordinate with DHS components, other Federal agencies, 
and state and local officials to develop locally based assessments of homeland security 
capabilities.  Local assessment will be crucial to developing a national preparedness 
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assessment and more effective and efficient decisions about resource allocations, exercise 
planning, grants, and risk management. 
• Regional staff will coordinate preparedness activities with DHS 
headquarters offices to assist state and local officials.  Fundamental 
preparedness activities include: 
• Coordinating with the Office of Grants and Training to review exercise 
plans and schedules, and grant guidance and applications; 
• Coordinating local, state, and regional homeland security strategies to 
integrate with the National Homeland Security Strategy; 
• Supporting the attainment of the National Preparedness Goals 
• Coordinating assistance from DHS components and other Federal 
agencies; 
• Providing DHS leadership with an assessment of regional capabilities; 
• Recommending priorities for homeland security programs, grants, and 
activities. 
e. Communication and Coordination 
The Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) is a standing facility 
currently operated by FEMA that coordinates regional response efforts, establishes 
Federal response priorities, and implements local Federal program support until a JFO is 
established in the field and/or other key DHS incident management officials can assume 
their NRP coordination responsibilities.164  The RRCC establishes communications with 
the affected State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the National Resource 
Coordination Center (NRCC), coordinates deployment of the Emergency Response 
Team–Advance Element (ERT-A) to field locations, assesses damage information, 
develops situation reports, and issues initial mission assignments. the RRCC, staffed by 
regional personnel, coordinates initial regional and field activities such as deployment of 
the ERT and ERT-A.  
                                                 
164 DHS, Quick Reference Guide to the Final Version of the National Response Plan, (Washington, 
D.C.: DHS, 2006). 
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This proposal recommends reorganizing the Regional Response 
Coordination Centers as Regional Homeland Security Operations Centers (RHSOC), 
providing 24X7 staffing to coordinate information sharing and deployment of Federal 
resources with state, and local governments.  The RHSOC would develop a regional 
threat assessment in conjunction with the Joint Terrorism Task Forces in the region based 
on local and national reporting and operations.  The RHSOC would evaluate local and 
regional threat information to prevent future terrorist incidents.  The RHSOC will be 
scalable in order to meet increasing threat level as needed. 
 
Level 1 - Normal Situation is monitored by RHSOC Watch 24X7.   
Level 2 - Alert An increased threat level or an incident notification is made to agencies 
and support staff who would need to take action as part of their 
responsibilities.  RHSOC is augmented as required by the situation. 
Level 3 - Partial Activation Limited activation when a major incident is very probable or following 
an incident which doesn't require full activation.  Primary staff are 
activated and interagency liaisons are activated or notified of potential 
activation. 
Level 4 - Full Scale Activation All primary and interagency liaisons are activated and support agencies 
are notified.  The RHSOC is supporting incident response until the 
activation of a Joint Field Office. 
Table 3.   RHSOC Levels of Operation 
 
The Office of Infrastructure Protection Protective Security Advisors (PSA) 
will assist state and local governments identify national, regional, and local critical 
infrastructure and assist in determining the need for protective measures for those 
facilities.  PSAs will coordinate day-to-day activities with the regional staff.  The 
regional staff will provide a regional assessment of trends and other infrastructure related 
information to the PSAs for assessment. 
f. Grants and Training 
State and local governments have responsibility for training and exercises 
within their jurisdiction.  DHS and other federal agencies administer national level 
programs that support training and exercise activities across all levels of government.  
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Exercise planning, development, and execution require a significant amount of 
coordination among the participating agencies.  The regional staff will coordinate 
exercise planning with the Office of Grants and Training and assist in the coordination of 
exercise planning to facilitate regional collaboration and ensure capability gaps are 
addressed.  The regional staff will participate in exercise within their region to the 
greatest extent possible. 
The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) was 
developed to enhance assess terrorism prevention, response, and recovery capabilities of 
Federal, state, and local governments.  Exercises promote coordination and collaboration 
among federal, state, and local to meet preparedness goals.  Homeland security exercises 
utilize resources of multiple federal, state, and local governments and agencies.  The 
regional staff will ensure that these resources are effectively coordinated.   
HSPD-8 required the development of a National Exercise Program that 
support achievement of the national preparedness goal.  The National Exercise Program 
ensures exercise and activities support the unified national preparedness strategy and 
achievement of the national preparedness goal.  Coordinated exercise planning should 
eliminate duplicative efforts and identify opportunities to combine training and exercises, 
and engage Federal, state, and local stakeholders to ensure collective preparedness 
• Exercise activities of the regional staff include coordination with state and 
local authorities to:  
• Develop exercise planning timeline and milestones; 
• Assigning planning to identify exercise objectives, design the scenario to 
meet regional needs, develop evaluation, control, and simulation 
requirements; 
• Schedule planning conferences to coordinate exercise planning and 
execution; 
• Coordinate appropriate participation from Federal agencies; 
• Ensure exercise comply with appropriate authorities and guidance; 
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• Assist in designing, conducting, and evaluating exercise; 
• Assist with implementation of corrective actions and lessons learned. 
Grant funding is provided to the state for exercise programs.  The National 
Strategy for Homeland Security requires that civilian response personnel and government 
entities successfully complete at least one exercise annually as a means to measure 
performance and allocate resources.  Responsibility for these requirements are 
complementary and require that all parties collaborate in order to achieve success. 
3. Staffing Requirements 
The regional staff will coordinate development of a regional strategy with federal, 
state, and local partners; coordinate/support federal allocation of resources to support 
regional strategy; develop regional threat, vulnerability, and risk assessments based on 
regional and federal information fusion; coordinate regional training and exercise 
programs; identify regional critical infrastructure and national critical infrastructure 
within the region; develop regional communication strategy; coordinate/support mutual 
aid agreements; coordinate inter-region support agreements.  The DHS regional 
operations section will provide personnel to each state’s Emergency Operations Center to 
monitor situational awareness and coordinate vertical and horizontal information sharing.  
Additional regional staff would then be deployed on a risk analysis basis to coordinate 
federal assistance for prevention and preparedness.  
Preliminary analysis indicates a requirement for approximately eighty fulltime 
personnel for each regional staff including staffing for a 24/7 RHSOC.  The Regional 
Staff will be organized in four divisions: operations, planning, preparedness, and 
administration. 
• Operations.  The Operations Division will facilitate regional partnership 
teams with State, local, and tribal governments to manage risk and allocate 
resources including outreach to regional homeland security partners.  The 
Operations Division includes the RHSOC which provides situational 
awareness, current resource capabilities, and a common operational 
picture for the Regional Homeland Security Director and the regional 
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partners.  The RHSOC will facilitate communications with State, and local 
partners.  The operations section will be responsible for: 
o Organizing resources (members of community, technical 
resources, etc.); 
o Developing Risk Assessments (potential hazards); 
o Developing strategies goals, objectives and actions to reduce 
hazards; and 
o Implementing plans and monitoring progress. 
• Planning and Analysis.  The Planning and Analysis Division will 
facilitate effective and efficient integrated contingency planning with 
State, local, and tribal governments based on the regional strategy.  
Analysts will develop regional strategies and conduct risk assessments and 
threat analyses.   
• Preparedness.  The Preparedness Division will facilitate the coordination 
of preparedness programs including a regional training and exercise 
program.  The staff will assess regional capabilities, coordinate exercises, 
and evaluate regional readiness.  
• Administration.  The Administration Division will provide management 
support for the regional staff including human resources, information 
technology, budget and finance, security, legal, and clerical services. 
 
Division Staffing Notes 
Operations 15 3 per State 
RHSOC 25 5 sections 
Communications and Outreach 5 1 per State 
Planning and Analysis 15 3 per State 
Preparedness 12  
Administration 13  
Total 80  

























Historically, the American governance system, divided into federal, state and 
local jurisdictions, does not provide a natural vehicle for discussing public policy issues 
from a regional, multi-jurisdictional perspective. The autonomy of local jurisdictions and 
competing priorities within and among them makes regional coordination difficult. 
Efforts that seek to overcome these challenges to coordinate regionally must take into 
account the different operational structures and civic traditions of states and 
municipalities.165 
The establishment of a Homeland Security Regional Structure will support the 
DHS Mission of leading a unified national effort to secure America.  The homeland 
security regions will enhance the national effort to prepare for threats and hazards to the 
nation.  The regional structure will move DHS support closer to state, and local 
governments that have been overwhelmed by new requirements for homeland security 
within their jurisdictions.  Engaging state and local governments at the regional level 
provides the best opportunities for the integration of homeland security efforts across all 
levels of government. 
Establishing and operating the regional structure will require strong coordination 
mechanisms and to ensure and efficient and effective delivery of DHS services to state 
and local entities throughout the nation.  Establishing Homeland Security Regions to 
develop a unified effort across Federal, State, local, and tribal governments in order to 
coordinate homeland security functions.  The regions would provide a more manageable 
span of control for the Secretary and provide the capability to more effectively reach out 
to State, local, and tribal governments.   
A regional structure would allow DHS to engage state and local governments to 
coordinate strategies and share homeland security information based on the highest 
probability threats to a geographic region.  DHS would establish and staff offices to 
coordinate among the states in the region.  The Regional Homeland Security Director  
 
                                                 
165 GAO, Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination. 
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would review resources within the region and facilitate agreements between government 
entities to more efficiently utilize assets, evaluate requests for regional resources, and 
coordinate the use of Federal resources. 
Establishing a common DHS regional structure would enable the Department to 
develop homeland security culture among DHS component field elements and State and 
local governments.  DHS component agencies maintain their pre-existing field structures 
without common operational boundaries, goals, or missions from DHS.  Component 
agencies and other Federal Departments and agencies continue to coordinate 
independently with State and local governments lending continued confusion over roles 
and responsibilities.  The uncoordinated response to Hurricane Katrina highlighted the 
lack of understanding of State and local requirements at the Headquarters level.   
The DHS field structure provides the opportunity for DHS to gain a better 
understanding of homeland security activities at the State and local level.  The regional 
teams would enhance relationships with local governments, assist with regional planning 
and exercises, and be prepared to manage and coordinate responses to incidents and be 
more effective in monitoring homeland security grant spending.166  The DHS field 
structure would allow the development of a DHS culture beyond headquarters, by 
establishing senior DHS field representatives and a single point of contact for homeland 
security within specific geographic areas or regions.  Establishing a field structure would 
also provide the opportunity for the Department to align component agency boundaries to 
better coordinate homeland security activities.  
                                                 
166 House Committee on Homeland Security, Management Challenges. 
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